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I. INTRODUCTION 
I need not tell you that the world situation is very serious. That must 
be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the 
problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of 
facts presented to the public by press and radio make it 
exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear 
appraisement of the situation.1
A. BACKGROUND 
The issues concerning European unity, power and burden-sharing, and 
the underpinning issues of an American security guarantee to European states, 
have, to a large extent, plagued the United States (U.S.)-European relationship, 
at least since World War II and throughout the entire Cold War era. As the U.S, 
has historically acted in its own domestic, regional and global interests, U.S. 
willingness to act in concert with European interests has not always been 
guaranteed.  
The transatlantic partnership and particularly the relation between the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union (EU) in the 
actual context of enlargement are characterized by at least three major aspects: 
• Extension of the security umbrella, primarily a NATO issue, which is 
reinforced and sustained by the depth of the European 
commitment. 
• Participation in the economic community, through free trade and 
globalization.  
• Political commitment, towards healing the drift, overcoming 
disagreements and finding common ground. 
This thesis looks at the first two aspects: the economic and the security 
dimensions of the transatlantic partnership on the background of the NATO-EU 
enlargement processes. The two dimensions are interrelated and require policies 
that reinforce each other.  
 
1 Address of Secretary of State George C. Marshall at Harvard University, June 1947.  
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For the past years, NATO and the EU have been expanding their 
memberships in the Euro-Atlantic region in a largely uncoordinated fashion. On 
the one hand, NATO has overlooked some of the potential geopolitical and 
political-economic considerations. On the other, the EU has had the tendency to 
expand without thorough consideration of the geopolitical and military 
repercussions. Consequently, the transatlantic tensions mounted and the Allies 
have begun to engage in a number of political-military disputes over the 
appropriate nature of defense capabilities and the potential duplication of military 
assets.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall has created a uni-polar world. At the heart of the 
security and defense question is the distribution of “political influence” versus 
“burden-sharing” within the two key institutions, NATO and EU, or in general 
between the U.S. and its allies.  
In essence, the Europeans have demanded a greater share in political-
military decision-making within the U.S. dominated North Atlantic Alliance. The 
Americans have, in response, insisted that the Europeans increase their defense 
spending and share more of the military burden and responsibility, yet have been 
reluctant to actually share power. Concurrently, Washington has augmented its 
military capabilities to the point where the U.S. has already proven during the 
Iraq war that it is an “ultra-power” quite capable of acting unilaterally, with or 
without the consent of its Allies. 
For Europeans, the concern was that the nature of new threats plus the 
war on terrorism have tended to draw American attention away from the Euro-
Atlantic region, despite the fact that problems in the Balkans have not been 
entirely resolved and, most crucially, that new tensions and conflicts may arise as 
NATO and the EU continue their largely uncoordinated enlargement. This gave 
Europeans an additional incentive to develop their own defense capabilities 
under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), in order to be able to 
undertake military action at a global scale in cases where NATO as a whole is 
not involved.  
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At a minimum, the global range and nature of these new threats and 
potential conflicts could result in the overextension of both American and 
European military capabilities. At worst, it could lead to even more fundamental 
disagreements, if not to a gradual alienation of the transatlantic partnership. That 
might be the risk if an expanding EU cannot soon take on greater responsibility 
for its own defense in close coordination with the U.S. on the basis of a rough 
political-economic and military parity.  
As opposed to high military spending in the U.S., European prospects for 
significant increases in military budgets are slim (except in France and the UK). 
Other solutions, national and multinational, to the problem of capacity shortfalls 
and ways to use existing resources better, are therefore being considered and 
pursued. One prominent idea strongly supported by France, Germany and the 
UK was that of creating the European Defence Agency (EDA), an 
intergovernmental defense capability development body aimed at closing the 
capabilities gap by sustaining the development of Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), and eventually leading to a common procurement program. This 
made it easier to gradually depart from the long-standing EU ban on using EU 
financial resources for defense purposes.  
Today’s security environment, characterized by new threats emerging 
from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), international 
terrorism and rogue states, presented NATO longstanding members with 
challenges for which they were somewhat unprepared. Moreover, the 
enlargement process has extended NATO commitments and augmented its 
transformation challenges. Integration of the new members after the two rounds 
of enlargement proved to be a greater challenge than initially estimated.  
Likewise, the development of ESDP is facing other types of challenges 
along its enlargement process such as: divergent perspectives amongst the core 
EU  states  (France, Britain and Germany),  as  how  to  deal with Turkey, Russia  
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and Ukraine as potential full membership aspirants, shrinking defense budgets, 
and last but not least, the growing concern over the consequences of the 
Europe’s aging population.  
 
B. PURPOSE 
This thesis looks at the evolution of the transatlantic relations with 
particular focus on relations between NATO and EU’s ESDP. It emphasizes the 
linkage between the economic, security and stability dimensions, assesses the 
risks of the parallel NATO-EU uncoordinated enlargement and attempts to draw 
useful insights for the defense representatives and policymakers.  
This research aims at identifying effective ways to help improve the 
transatlantic relations. Moreover, the thesis addresses both sides of the coin: one 
side is related with the ability of NATO and EU to cope together and coordinate 
their enlargement on the basis of sharing common values and strong economic 
ties; the flip side links with the strategies and reforms pursued by the new 




This thesis presents an overview of the military and economic challenges 
imposed by the parallel enlargement process, offering valuable insights for the 
defense officials and policymakers within NATO and the EU. At the same time, 
the findings of this research will provide Romanian decision-makers with an 
analysis and decision support tool that will help them choose the best strategies 
to smoothen and boost integration efforts in both NATO and the EU.  
Romania is fully engaged in this transformation process of becoming not 
only  a  consumer  but  also an active security and stability provider in the region.  
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Nevertheless, other new NATO members and EU membership aspirants may 
find some of the findings and policy recommendations formulated in this study 
useful and applicable. 
 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will develop an analysis of the transatlantic relations on the 
background of the NATO-EU double enlargement process. It will attempt to 
identify the sources of transatlantic tensions and difficulties posed by the 
enlargement and integration processes, and suggest solutions to mitigate risks.  
The analysis is based on an in-depth literature review using a variety of 
sources. Primary sources include NATO and EU publications, directives, 
regulations, plans, and news reports. Secondary sources include newsletters, 
periodicals, professional journals, scholarly books, essays and research papers 
related with NATO and EU enlargement. 
 
E. ORGANIZATION 
The thesis is organized into five chapters as follows: 
Chapter I introduces the topic, scope and methodology of the research. 
Chapter II defines the concept of security and discusses the interrelationships 
within the triad economics-security-stability. Chapter III presents the U.S.-EU 
relations today, with emphasis on the shared values but different approaches to 
security and the economic implications. Chapter IV analyzes the developments in 
the relation between NATO and ESDP today from the perspectives of 
collaboration versus competition, and power versus burden sharing. It also 
makes an assessment of the risks of the NATO-EU double uncoordinated 
enlargement. Chapter V summarizes the findings of the research, drawing 
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II. THE TRIAD ECONOMICS – STABILITY – SECURITY 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter explores the interrelations in the triad economics-stability-
security, which is by no means a simple topic. This chapter helps to explain the 
author's choice to address both economic and security dimensions of the 
transatlantic partnership in the context of the NATO-EU “double enlargement.” 
The purpose is to provide insights of the institutional framework and the 
challenges posed by the new international development in the post Cold War era.  
The author's perspective on the economics-stability-security triad is that 
without stability economies stagnate or become dysfunctional.  By the same 
token, without a functioning and developing economy, security is threatened, and 
furthermore, without security, neither stability nor a functioning economy can be 
guaranteed. In other words, with respect to the transatlantic partnership, the 
security dimension will provide practical forms of cooperation with the Allies, 
while the economic dimension may supply avenues of entry into the EU. Last but 
not least, the stability dimension will be the liaison element and the guarantee of 
equilibrium.  
Economic factors, power and security have always been a central theme 
in security studies. The relationship between economics and security is pretty 
straightforward: economic capacity being one basis for military power.  At a more 
practical level, the place of the defense sector in national budgets and the 
opportunity cost of defense, which imposes sacrifices in other elements of public 
expenditure, adds a substantial economic dimension to security and defense 
policy. 
A further dimension to the relationship between economics and security 
was added by the growing size of transnational flows of goods and services and 
the rising levels of interdependence and collaboration between countries.  In this 
respect, globalization is one factor contributing to processes of regional 
 8
                                           
economic integration. The European experience has demonstrated that such 
economic integration may in turn have stabilizing effects on regional security. 
The end of the cold war has changed the world distribution of power and 
reiterated the need for an enhanced transatlantic partnership.  For the 
Europeans, the new strategic problem had two critical elements.  First, recasting 
the position of a new Germany in a new Europe and, second, stabilizing Europe's 
Eastern borders.  The dissolution of the Soviet Union left a set of countries on the 
eastern flank of West Europe that presents a new set of problems.2  Some of 
them are not yet stable democracies or entrenched market economies, and they 
do not have clearly defined security relationships. Both these tasks produced 
over the last two decades new tensions between security and economic 
purposes. The available set of tools is principally European, but as already 
acknowledged, in the long run it is in America's interest to contribute and ease 
these tensions.  
America supports a strong Europe because we need a strong 
partner in the hard work of advancing freedom in the world.3 
The primary route through which the U.S. contributes to European security 
is NATO. The institutional framework and the European Security triangle are 
further discussed in this chapter. 
 
B. THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY 
The notion of security of a state is frequently used, despite that its users 
only rarely define it.  As this thesis deals with important and sensitive issues for  
 
2 Steven Weber & John Zysman, “Why the Changed Relation between Security and 
Economy will Alter the Character of the Europe Union”, available online at: 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=brie. Accessed 25 March 
2005. 
3 President Bush speech in Brussels, Belgium, 22 February 2005. Available online at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050221.html. Accessed 27 March 2005. 
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the U.S. and EU, the need to define this concept appears evident. The first step 
in defining security is to address its two key elements: the concepts of state and 
threat4 to national security.  
Weber’s traditional definition of state required as a necessary condition 
the “effective monopoly on the use or licensing of violence within a given 
territory.”5 Consequently, the security of states is threatened by any change that 
might endanger that monopoly of violence, whether through external invasion or 
internal rebellion. Ullman defines a threat to national security as something that 
either "(1) threatens drastically to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of 
a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices 
available."6
1. Definitions of Security 
The definition of security of a state found in international relations 
dictionaries usually covers two aspects: a state's lack of threat and the 
effectiveness of its guaranteed protection against threats. The key problem in 
defining security is that it is an inherently fuzzy and highly contextual concept.  
Security is often assessed “by comparison with other related concepts such as: 
safety, continuity, reliability, stability.”7
The theoretical difficulty with limiting the concept of security to the use of 
physical violence is that most if not “all economic and political relations are 
characterized by force, whether threatened or actually employed.”8 In this 
respect, an eloquent example is the American approach of “diplomacy backed by 
 
4 This notion has several dimensions, starting with psychological, then becoming real or 
potential, and finally indicating a subjective or objective element of the threat. 
5 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, available online at: 
http://www2.pfeiffer.edu/~lridener/DSS/Weber/polvoc.html. Accessed 21 March 2005. 
6 Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security Vol. 8, No. 1, Summer 1983. 
7 Katarzyna Zukrowska, “The Link between Systemic Transformation and Security; General 
Assessments of Regional Cooperation in South Eastern Europe”, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/2001-12e.pdf. Accessed 17 March 2005. 
8 Stephen Sachs, “The Changing Definition of Security”, Merton College, Oxford, 2003, 
available online at: http://www.stevesachs.com/papers/paper_security.html. Accessed 17 
February 2005. 
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force”9, materialized in a wide spectrum ranging from economic sanctions10 and 
embargos to military interventions and preemptive actions.11
Ayoob formulates a comprehensive definition of security, which is a 
significant deviation from the traditional realist analysis of military threats.  In his 
approach, security is defined “in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and 
external, which threaten or have the potential to bring down or significantly 
weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes.”12
The definition of security that currently is initiating the greatest debate 
within the Security Studies community is Stephen Walt's traditionalist 
perspective13. He articulates a position that is state-centric and restricts the 
application of security to threats in the military realm. Walt equates security with 
peace and the prevention of conflict through military means (deterrence policies, 
non-offensive defense and the like). 
Conceptualizing security today is not as straightforward as it was during 
the Cold War. Thus, several scholars within the Security Studies community have 
advocated  “redefining  the  very concept of security itself.”14  While traditionalists  
 
9 Ambassador Vershbow, “Speech on NATO-European Union Defense Cooperation”, 
Waterloo, Belgium, October 2000. 
10 William Wallace & Jan Zielonka, “Misunderstanding Europe”, Foreign Affairs, New York, 
November/December 1998, available online at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19981101faessay1433/william-wallace-jan-
zielonka/misunderstanding-europe.html. Accessed 23 December 2004. Authors maintain, “Two 
thirds of the world's population is now covered by some form of U.S. sanctions”. 
11 President G. W. Bush, “State of the Union Address”, January 2002, available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/2002012911.html. Accessed 7 November 
2004. President Bush has officially introduced a new doctrine concerning the ever-changing 
security environment. Emphasizing the possibility of a linkage between rogue states, weapons of 
mass destruction and terrorist groups, President Bush maintained, "preemptive action by the U.S. 
against rogue state proliferators as well as terrorist groups is justified".  
12 Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World Politics 43:2, 
January 1991. 
13 Stephen Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies”. Mershon International Studies 
Review 41: 211-39,1991. 
14 Sarah Terry, “Defining Security: Normative Assumptions and Methodological 
Shortcomings”, Conference of Defense Associations Institute, November 1998. 
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favor the maintenance of the Cold War conception of security (defined in military 
and state-centric terms), the non-traditionalists have attempted to broaden and 
deepen the definition.   
Among the non-traditionalists, there is a further division between two sub-
groups: the so-called “wideners" and “deepeners.”15  The wideners argue that a 
predominantly military definition does not acknowledge that the greatest threats 
to state survival may not be military, but environmental, social and economic.  On 
the other hand, the deepeners ask the question of “whose security is being 
threatened?”16, and support a definition focused on the individual or system, 
rather than isolating the state. 
In the context of international relations, security means that “the needs 
and interests of the participants on the international stage are sufficiently 
covered, while the consequences affect not only interested groups but also the 
whole international system.”17 Therefore the division between international and 
national security appears to be rather artificial. In fact, the security of states in 
international relations always has a national dimension as well.  Probably, the 
best example in this is the willingness of the EU members to pool their 
sovereignty in order to gain economic power and world influence. 
2. Hard vs. Soft Dimensions of Security 
Since the experience of the two World Wars, the nature of conflict has 
changed dramatically.  Historical experience shows that after 1945 many of the 
most significant threats to state security have been internal rather than external.  
In the past, the security model was mainly based on a “hard“(military) 
security dimension, while “soft” (non-military) dimensions played a secondary 
role in the system. In the aftermath of the Cold War, “the roles of both hard and 
 
15 Sarah Terry, “Defining Security: Normative Assumptions and Methodological 
Shortcomings”, Conference of Defense Associations Institute, November 1998. 
16 Ibid. 
17. Katarzyna Zukrowska “Link between economics, stability and security in a transforming 
economy”, NATO Economics Colloquium, Brussels, November 1999. 
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soft dimensions have changed.”18 The hard dimension of security has not 
disappeared totally, but the soft dimensions “are now taking the lead”.19 The shift 
is happening on both national and international levels as well.  
For the past two decades, there has been a fundamental re-thinking of the 
very framework of state security. As Holsti notes, "security between states in 
many areas (the Third World, the former Soviet Union, etc.), has become 
increasingly dependent on security within those states.”20 Cross-border war has 
become a primarily "small-or medium-power activity."21  Thus policymakers in the 
U.S. and Europe have turned their attention on other types of conflicts.22
Moreover, lack of an external threat is often regarded as a destabilizing23 
factor by leaving room for internal confrontations.24 This is particularly true in 
most post-communist states, mainly those that were multinational, incorporated 
minorities, or faced religion or cultural conflicts. The remedy for this was found in 
a quick departure from the old system and setting the economy on the path of 
accelerated growth. 
The shift in the nature of conflict has also forced states to consider new 
strategies of protecting their monopoly on violence.  One relevant example is the 
longstanding effort to prevent the proliferation of conventional and 
unconventional weapons.  States have few resources to defend against the 
 
18 Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," Foreign Affairs 68, No. 2, Spring 1989. 
19 Katarzyna Zukrowska, “The Link between Systemic Transformation and Security; General 
Assessments of Regional Cooperation in South Eastern Europe”, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/2001-12e.pdf. Accessed 17 March 2005. 
20 Kalevi Holsti, “The State, War, and the State of War”, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
21 Center for Conflict Studies, The Journal of Conflict Studies, available online at: 
http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get4.cgi?directory=spring99/&filename=rickard.htm. 
Accessed 7 December 2004. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Michael Desch, “Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment”, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 
24 Pauline Baker & Angeli Weller, “An Analytical Model of Internal conflict and State 
Collapse”, Washington D.C., The Fund for Peace, 1998. Unlike earlier theorists of internal 
conflict, who viewed state collapse as a result of internal conflict, Pauline Baker argues that state 
collapse often leads to internal conflict”. 
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catastrophic delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) “such as via small 
airplanes, ballistic missiles, or advanced "reconnaissance strikes."25 Moreover, 
the growing reach and sophistication of international terrorism poses a further 
threat that cannot easily be countered by traditional military organizations.  Thus, 
states "are turning to cooperative security approaches"26 in order to achieve their 
security goals. 
The nature of new conflicts required defense planners to look beyond 
traditional aspects like "material capabilities and the use and control of military 
force by states."27 Instead, states must look for solutions to problems such as 
"environmental pollution, depletion of the ozone layer, global warming, and 
massive migrations of unwanted refugees."28 These issues may only infrequently 
become the direct cause of conflict (as in the case of wars over scarce 
resources, such as water or oil), but could easily produce conflicts through the 
“mechanisms of economic decline and political instability.”29
In the contemporary world, with its stocks of missiles and WMD as well as 
new asymmetric threats such as famine, drugs, natural disasters, international 
crime and terrorism, “a country cannot be secure by building-up its military 
potential on its own.”30  Consequently, the old concept of self-defense becomes 
not only obsolete but also practically impossible to be achieved.  The alternative 
strategy is to build strong international institutions and join coalitions. This is one 
 
25 Janne E Nolan, John D. Steinbruner, Kenneth Flamm, Steven E. Miller, David Mussington, 
William J. Perry, and Ashton B. Carter. "The Imperatives for Cooperation." In Global 
Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, Janne E. Nolan ed., Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Peter Katzenstein, "Introduction," The Culture of National Security, Katzenstein ed., 1996. 
28 Center for Conflict Studies, The Journal of Conflict Studies, available online at: 
http://www.lib.unb.ca/Texts/JCS/bin/get4.cgi?directory=spring99/&filename=rickard.htm. 
Accessed 7 December 2004. 
29 Alexander Bevin, “The Future of Warfare”, New York: W.W. Norton &Co. Inc., 1995. 
30 Katarzyna Zukrowska, “The Link between Systemic Transformation and Security; General 
Assessments of Regional Cooperation in South Eastern Europe”, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/2001-12e.pdf. Accessed 17 March 2005. 
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of the underlying principles upon which the transatlantic partnership was built, 
and a strong reason for intensified NATO-EU security cooperation. 
3. The European Security Triangle 
An important element on the European security agenda is the integration 
with EuroAtlantic structures. This common U.S.-European initiative was set in 
motion through a set of policies and converging actions31 aimed at: 
• Pooling sovereignty in strengthened organizations and supplying 
them with new functions and powers;  
• Establishing new cooperative institutional solutions that continue to 
overlap, while other solutions enforce or deepen cooperation 
(Eurocorp);  
• Introducing solutions that enable cooperation among four groups of 
countries: NATO members, EU members, members of the two 
organizations and those which are outside those structures;  
• Establishing common military forces in Europe. 
Weaver's Security triangle presented in Figure 1 suggestively shows how 
European security is built upon institutional structures, which are supported by 
some military regimes and organizations as well as by strong interdependencies 
among states and their economies. The deeper such ties are, the stronger 
impact they have on stability and security.  
 
31 Katarzyna Zukrowska, “Link between economics, stability and security in a transforming 
economy”, NATO Economics Colloquium, Brussels November 1999. 
  
Figure 1.   The European Security Triangle32. 
 
There are numerous new solutions that are being built on top of the new 
emerging security system. These are: the European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI), common military troops, and the cooperative use of NATO's 
infrastructure by EU and NATO.  These new solutions show that the end of the 
Cold War has strengthened, in many ways, the existing institutions that form the 
core of the security structure in Europe.  
 
C. THE LINK BETWEEN ECONOMY, STABILITY AND SECURITY  
Links between economics, stability and security were defined differently 
before the Cold War, during it, and now as they are adjusting to new stages in 
international relations.  This difference results from different security models as 
well as economic ones.  
1. Stages of Economy and Security  
The linkages between economics, security and stability should be viewed 
dynamically. This facilitates understanding the current situation and the 
interrelations within the triad.  
                                            
32 From O. Weaver, “The European Security Triangle”, Working papers, No. 12, 1994. 
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The economic and security models evolved from self-sufficiency and 
confrontation towards globalization and cooperation. Historically, there can be 
distinguished three consecutive stages in the evolution of international relations 
that have influenced the examined triad according to the pattern presented in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   Parallel between the Security and Economic Models.33 
 




Multi-polar model - based on military 
component in which economy plays a 
secondary role. Defense doctrine is 
constructed upon self-sufficiency of 
defense, paralleled by self-sufficiency 
in production. Attempts to create 
coalitions lead to conflicts, as their 
construction is based upon temporary 
common interests, which deprive them 
of a stable component. Security model 
as well as model of international 
relations at this stage is based on the 
distribution of power.  
National economy model - based on 
the protection of producers and jobs. 
Developing mechanisms directly 
engaging the state in the production 
sphere. This model supported the use 
of protection measures in periods of 
recession, thus making the situation 
worse. It limited the possibilities of 
building long-term interests 
internationally. Its ability to stabilize 
was limited and incorporated a 




Bipolar model - shaped after WW2, 
was in force for over 45 years (1945-
1989). It led to an increase of the 
economic component, which in 
consequence resulted in priority 
treatment of economics and, later, the 
take-over of the role formerly fulfilled 
by the military factor. Security model 
Model of slow and gradual 
departure from protectionist 
measures by the slow and cautious 
opening of the economy on national, 
regional and global levels. This model 
was fostered by the Bretton Woods 
system (1944) which established the 
World Bank, IMF and later GATT. On 
                                            
33 After Katarzyna Zukrowska, “The Link between Systemic Transformation and Security: 
General Assessments of Regional Cooperation in South Eastern Europe”, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/2001/2001-12e.pdf. Accessed 17 March 2005. 
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at this stage is based on deterrence. a regional level, institutions such as 
the EC, EFTA, OECD and NAFTA 




Uni-polar model – in place after the 
dissolution of the USSR and Warsaw 
Pact. NATO and the U.S. play an 
active role with support of EU, WEU 
and CSCE in transition from bipolarity 
(two pillars: U.S. and USSR) towards 
uni-polarity specifically, the U.S. 
hegemony.  
Liberalized model of the global 
economy in which economies tend to 
be more interdependent, due to 
natural and geographic differences, 
and to relative differences in size, 
production factors and levels of 
development. Intensification of 
competition and liberalization, 
globalization and policy coordination 
are characteristic for this model. 
 
In the past, the security model was based on a balanced confrontation 
between the powers or superpowers and their allies.  This was the case both in 
the multi-polar and bipolar world, before and during the Cold War. Currently, 
security is based on interdependence and cooperation between states, which is 
enhanced by globalization, liberalization and established institutional structures. 
There is a list of relevant factors that influence the dynamics within the 
triad economics-stability-security.  They cover the following aspects: (1) size of 
the country, (2) stability of the economy, (3) stability of the political system, (4) 
relations with neighbors, (5) ability to adjust to changing conditions and their 
challenges, (6) the problem of national minorities, (7) institutionalization of 
external relations, and (8) opening up of the economy.  
2. Economic Power- the Premise for Security 
Economists have long recognized that any economic system may aim at 
more than one objective.  Among them are “growth of consumption, equity, 
stability, and the preservation of peace.”34  “Economy” is not an objective itself.  
                                            
34 Katarzyna Zukrowska “Link between economics, stability and security in a transforming 
economy”, NATO Economics Colloquium, Brussels November 1999. 
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Rather it is the rational pursuit of some combinations of the above-mentioned 
objectives. In this context, efficiency means achieving maximum current welfare 
from existing capabilities.35  
a. Economic and Security Tradeoffs 
A state can cover the costs of military expenditures when its 
economy is strong and healthy. The old perspective of the relationship between 
economics and security is that “it has long been a staple in international relations 
that economics and security conflict with each other.”36 In other words, fully 
satisfying security implies sacrificing at least some aspects of the economy or 
vice-versa. However, there are strong arguments to suggest that such an 
approach is no longer relevant.  
According to Moller37, the economic power of a nation inevitably 
constitutes a latent threat to its adversaries leading to the tendency of not 
contributing to the economic development of one’s enemies or opponents.  In 
extreme cases this could lead to a trade embargo.  This view was popular in the 
U.S. throughout the Cold War period, but lately this concept comes in sharp 
contradiction with liberal views of international trade which assumed that trade 
has beneficial effects on the propensity for war in the international system.38
Developments throughout the world demonstrate more and more 
that security and stability, both political and social, are multi-dimensional 
concepts, and that economics is one of the most important drivers. Moreover, 
there is a direct link between economy and security, which in most cases 
translates into the reality that “where an economy is more developed, prospects 
 
35 Martin Spechler, “Economics and security: comments and a suggested framework”, 
available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/1999/pdf/264-268.pdf. Accessed 7 March 
2005.  
36 Richard H.Schultz Jr., Roy Gordon & George Quester, “Security Studies for the 21st 
Century”, Brassey’s, Washington, 1998. 
37 B. Moller, “Security concepts”, Working Papers 18, Centre for Peace and Conflict 
Research, Copenhagen, 1993 
38 C. D. Goodwin, “National Security in classical political economy” in Economics and 
National Security, Duke University Press 1991, Annual Supplement to Vol. 23. 
for security and stability are much better.”39 Furthermore, it is equally clear that 
economic development depends on the policies promoted, be they at the national 
or international level. Appropriate policies generate a greater feeling of security, 
which in turn generates increased incentives for economic activities and, as a 
direct result, more prosperity.  
The U.S. and Europe have different approaches in pondering the 
economics and security tradeoffs.  As presented in Figure 2, the public opinion in 
the U.S. gives an increased importance to military power than in Europe (27 
percent in the U.S., vs. only 12 percent in Europe), while in turn Europeans give 
more importance to economic power (66 percent in the U.S. vs. 84 percent in 
Europe). 
 
Figure 2.   Importance of Economic vs. Military Strength.40 
                                            
39 Lazar Comanescu, “The Link between Economics, Security and Stability: the case of 
South-Eastern Europe”, available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/colloq/1999/pdf/036-042.pdf. 
Accessed 12 March 2005. 
40 From Worldviews 2002, “American and European Public Opinion & foreign Policy”, 
Comparative Report, available online at: 
http://www.worldviews.org/detailreports/compreport/index.htm Accessed 1 April 2005. 
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b. Developed versus Transforming Economies 
During the last decades, the nature and content of political and 
economic relations among states and within each society have dramatically 
changed. Growing economic interdependencies and the globalization of the 
economy have produced significant transformations in the way countries view 
their national objectives and interests, and hence the ways and instruments to 
promote them. This applies for security and stability interests/objectives as well.  
In the case of countries with developed economies, despite high 
rates of unemployment, there is a large well-established middle class that is not 
eager to be engaged in any clashes that could destabilize the security of the 
state. This is because a healthy economy is the premise for a comfortable 
standard of living, which in return does not stimulate tensions, while poverty has 
just the opposite effect.  
Moreover, the countries with strong economies are usually 
established democracies.  Historical evidence has confirmed the democratic 
peace theory41, which maintains that democratic states are unlikely to engage in 
wars with one another. Hence democracy is another guarantee for economic 
development and security. 
A clear confirmation of the strong link between economics on the 
one hand and security and stability on the other is provided by the way countries 
in Central and South-Eastern Europe evolved after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
The analysis of the situation in these countries confirms once more “while 
economic prosperity is strengthening security, the latter is in its turn a 
prerequisite for long term economic sustainable growth.”42 Reason is that 
“without confidence that resources invested today will still be owned and 
available tomorrow investment will wither, growth will decline and, eventually, as 
 
41 Wilkipedia, “Democratic peace theory”, available online at: 
http://www.answers.com/topic/democratic-peace-theory. Accessed 12 March 2005. 
42 Katarzyna Zukrowska “Link between economics, stability and security in a transforming 
economy”, NATO Economics Colloquium, Brussels November 1999. 
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assets depreciate, the economy will collapse.”43 Thus, security and economics 
are necessary complements: one cannot exist without the other. 
A vicious circle linking political destabilization and macro-
stabilization often occurs in transforming economies. Economic instability can be 
counted as a source of political instability as well as a factor that hampers 
economic growth. 
In the contemporary stage of international relations, the increased 
role of the economic dimension of security puts the states of Central and Eastern 
Europe in a particularly difficult situation, rooted in the weak economic potential, 
inherited by the former communist countries. The potential of those states is 
limited “as those countries produce only 3.1 percent of the world GDP while this 
territory is inhabited by 2.3 percent of the world’s population.”44  
Furthermore, there could be some arguments showing that those 
countries represented different levels of development and openness at the 
starting point to the reforms. That is true especially when we compare the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and Poland, the countries most advanced 
in transformation process, and Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania countries 
that are following the leaders and countries like Russia, Ukraine, Belarus or 
Georgia, which clearly lag behind. The latter group is far behind in the 
institutionalization process, with the result being that the economies of the 
countries in question are still relatively closed to external relations, and any 
macro-stabilization attempts fail. This leads to the formulation of incorrect 
arguments that “macro-stabilization policy is not able to bring the economy in 
those countries to equilibrium as it did in the case of Poland,”45 and that this is 
explained by national specifics.  The truth is that the specificity of the national 
 
43 Katarzyna Zukrowska “Link between economics, stability and security in a transforming 
economy”, NATO Economics Colloquium, Brussels November 1999. 
44 Robert Barro, "Economic growth in a cross-section of countries", The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 106:2, May 1991. 
45 Ibid. 
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situation and differences in the intensity of market forces put in motion bring 
different results to different economies. 
c. State’s Role and the Economic Opening  
In contemporary international relations, there is a return to classic 
economic theories, which in general advocate a “reduction of the state’s role in 
the economy.”46  As argued by Amatori47, this is one of the major differences 
between the American and European ways of doing business. While Americans48 
have adopted a “laissez-faire” approach in economy, focusing on shareholders 
interests with minimal intervention of the state, the European “clubby” economic 
model emphasizes the interests of stakeholders and is characterized by the 
presence of the state as a major player in the economy.  
The reduction of competition and state intervention are both in 
contradiction with the current trend of globalization. Moreover, fears that opening 
of the economy will kill weak and uncompetitive industries are basically wrong.  
Economic opening naturally brings some pressure to bear on 
national producers, but it also increases the supply of goods and the income for 
those engaged in trade. All this, in turn, stimulates demand, which finally results 
in greater investment and reduced unemployment.49 By this same token, the end 
of the Cold War changed the European-oriented business coalition, committing it 
to an Americanized market-driven strategy of growth as a means to revive 
competitiveness and create jobs.50
 
46 Michael Todaro & Steven Smith, Economic Development, Pearson Ed., 2002 
47 Franco Amatori, “European Business: New Strategies, Old Structures”, available online at: 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3040_388.pdf. Accessed 11 November 2004. 
48 In a speech "The Press under a Free Government" given in the 1920”s, President Calvin 
Coolidge maintained, “the chief business of the American people is business”.  
49 Maddison, A. “The World Economy: A Millennium Perspective”, OECD Paris, 2001. 
50 Franco Amatori, “European Business: New Strategies, Old Structures”, available online at: 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3040_388.pdf. Accessed 11 November 2004. 
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d. Sustainable Growth and Macro-stabilization 
In trying to catch up, each country has a choice for sustainable 
growth. Domar’s theory51 argues that the increase in investments should be 
matched with an increase in GNP, which in turn is matched by the level of 
savings. National savings can be replaced by foreign savings, which require an 
opening of the economy for the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). 
However, economic opening on its own is not a sufficient precondition for 
attracting capital to the economy. Investors search for low risk opportunities. 
Macro stabilization is crucial in this context.  
Another approach would be the cumulative growth of the economy, 
which is based on Keynesian and post-Keynesian theories.52 According to these 
theories, the rate of growth can be accelerated by an increase in the rate of 
investment in annual terms. Adding FDI investments to national savings can 
accomplish this.  
All theories on FDI indicate that “inflows are attracted to countries 
with low investment risks, meaning to countries with low inflation and high 
stability.”53 Naturally, this can not be considered as the only precondition for 
inflows of FDI, as investors make their decisions taking into account the 
availability of skilled labour, prospects to achieve costs advantages, market size, 
etc. In this way, there is a close link between macro-stabilization, development 
and wealth. In other words, macro-stabilization is a “precondition for growth, 
which in turn can result in economic and social stabilization and an increased 
level of state security.”54  
 
 
51 Evsey Domar, “Essays in the theory of economic growth”, Greenwood Press, London, 
1982. 
52 Fadhel Kaboub, “Long-run Keynesian Growth Theory: Harrod and Domar vs. Solow”, 
available online at: http://f.students.umkc.edu/fkfc8/HDGrowth.html. Accessed 21 February 2005. 
53 Eduardo Borensztein, Jose de Gregorio, and Jong-Wha Lee, "How Does Foreign Direct 
Investment Affect Economic Growth?", IMF Research Department, July 1994. 
54 Stanley Fischer, "The role of macroeconomic factors in growth", Journal of Monetary 
Economics Vol 32, No. 3, December 1993. 
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3. The Need for Competition and Coordination in EU’s Economic 
Policies 
Economic policy competition and coordination have been integral parts of 
the European integration process since its origins. The need for coordination 
between national fiscal policies and euro-zone monetary policy arises from the 
potential costs of uncertainty regarding the direction of the policy-mix at the euro-
zone level. Thus, the EU governments have embraced a “culture of 
coordination.”55 Coordination takes place along two broad lines: participation in 
the rule making and commitment to decisions implementation. The economic 
literature provides two rationales for economic policy coordination.  
The first rationale sees coordination as “a means of supplying public 
goods which decentralized actions are unlikely to produce.”56  In the European 
context, the most obvious examples of economic public goods are the 
preservation of the single market and stability in the financial markets within the 
euro-zone. In the macro-economic realm, “fiscal discipline also became a sort of 
European public good” 57 during the transition to the European Monetary Union 
(EMU).  
The second rationale emphasizes that the need for coordination increases 
with the degree of economic interdependence between countries. Coordination 
requires member states economic policies to be conceived in a cooperative way, 
even when the key objectives remain purely national.58
a. From the Maastricht Treaty to the Lisbon Process 
European economic policy coordination is explicitly mentioned as a 
common objective in the Treaty of Maastricht, in effect since 1993. The Treaty 
established that EU members wishing to qualify for the EMU had to show 
 
55 Pierre Jacquet & Jean Pisani-Ferri, “Economic co-ordination in the euro-zone”, Centre for 
European Reform, London 2000. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Pierre Jacquet & Jean Pisani-Ferri, “Economic co-ordination in the euro-zone”, Centre for 
European Reform, London 2000. 
58 Report of the Council on Economic Policy Coordination, endorsed by the European 
Council in Vienna on 12 Dec. 1998, available online at: 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/emureport.html . Accessed 11 March 2005. 
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sufficient budget discipline by 1998. Specifically, by that date, the budget deficit 
and government debt had to be below 3 and 60 percent of GDP, respectively.  
EMU is an economic project “driven first and foremost by political 
goals, not by strict cost calculations of economic benefit.”59 Nevertheless, there 
are also solid economic arguments that favor EMU. A single currency provides a 
more solid foundation for long-term non-inflationary growth to a unified European 
market by reducing transaction costs and other uncertainties connected to 
currency fluctuations.60
The European Central Bank (ECB) was set up in 1998, under the 
Treaty on European Union, to introduce and manage the new currency. The ECB 
is responsible for framing and implementing the EU’s economic and monetary 
policy, conducting foreign exchange operations and ensuring the smooth 
operation of payment systems. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) of 1997 was designed to give 
concrete content to several aspects of the Maastricht Treaty regarding economic 
policies in the European Monetary Union, but lately, there is growing consensus 
that the SGP will need some adjustment.  The approaches on the necessary 
changes range from “radical surgery” (practically rewriting the pact) to “don’t 
touch it.”61 Most of the criticism is related to the pact’s flaws to treat countries on 
a differential basis, to account for the economic cycle effects, and to implement a 
credible mechanism of sanctions.  
 
59 Steven Weber & John Zysman, “Why the Changed Relation between Security and 
Economy will Alter the Character of the Europe Union”, available online at: 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=brie. Accessed 25 March 
2005. 
60 The Economist, "Europe's Monetary Union", no. 7763, June 13, 1992. 
61 “How should be the Stability and Growth Pact be Reformed?”, Finance and Development, 
June 2004, available online at: http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3041_Europe_9.pdf. Accessed 
30 November 2004. 
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The Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact also put in 
place a system of multilateral surveillance similar to that for the Lisbon process.62  
The European Council of March 2000 in Lisbon set up a series of criteria and 
policy suggestions to reach “a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
economic cohesion.”63  
Although some progress was made on innovating Europe's 
economy, there is growing concern that the reform process is not going fast 
enough and that the ambitious targets will not be reached. Euro-skeptics 
consider the 2010 envisioned Lisbon strategy with its targeted knowledge-based 
society as an “innocuous exercise in Euro-verbosity.”64
 
62 European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, Lisbon, March 2000, available online at: 
http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm. Accessed 3 April 
2005. 
63 Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, “The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, No 4, Vol. 18, Fall 2004. 
64 Ibid. 
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III. THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP TODAY 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter discusses the current state of the relation between the U.S. 
and EU. While not fundamentally called into question on either side of the 
Atlantic, post Cold War transatlantic ties have become more complex. 
Developments in the world's geo-strategic situation are accompanied by growing 
threats. The EU and the U.S. have to confront global challenges such as terrorist 
threats, menace to security and stability, weapons proliferation, drugs, organized 
crime and many other important issues.  
This new security environment puts the question of transatlantic relations 
into a new light. In the new political-economic architecture of Europe, 
complementarily dimensions of security and economy objectives gave way to 
new tensions between the two shores of the Atlantic.  
The transatlantic relations have been on a somewhat bumpy ride in recent 
years with disagreements over issues ranging from the Iraq war to the Kyoto 
Treaty, the arms embargo on China, and the International Criminal Court. These 
matters, however, are only a small part of an otherwise well functioning 
partnership.65  
Polemics on “hard” versus “soft” security solutions oppose the U.S. option 
for unilateral action to EU’s multilateral cooperation approach. The optimal 
solution is to reach a compromise between the talk of preeminence and 
unilateralism by the U.S. and the greater willingness by the EU to step up and 
share the burden.66  
 
 
65 “Transatlantic Relations”, Security & Defence February 2005, available online at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-133371-16&type=LinksDossier. Accessed 3 April 
2005. 
66 Gunter Burhardt, “A Chance to Rebuild the Transatlantic Partnership”, European Institute, 
Fall 2004, available online at: 
http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2004_fall/2004_fall_30.php4. Accessed 11 April 
2005. 
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B. U.S. - EU RELATIONS  
The bond that ties Europe to the U.S. goes back in the history of the last 
century. America helped Europe in the two World Wars and through the Marshall 
Plan67, rebuilt the economies of Western Europe.  
European integration has been a core U.S. goal since the Truman 
administration. President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall 
blessed the antecedents of the Common Market, which eventually became the 
EU. The original policy goal was twofold: first, contain Soviet expansionism and 
second, anchor Germany within a larger, democratic European collectivity.68  
The collapse of communism was an historic opportunity to reunite Europe. 
The history of the EU springs directly from those days. Europe and the U.S. 
became each other's principal partner in addressing the crosscutting issues on 
the international agenda.  
Through the Cold War, Western Europe and the U.S. had a common 
enemy in the Soviet Union. NATO provided the collective security arrangement 
against this clear threat. Occasional tensions sprang at times from European 
worries about whether the U.S. “might return to isolationism or American irritation 
with lack of European investment in defense.”69  
The decade of the 1990s brought a cascade of events. The fall of the 
Berlin Wall triggered fundamental changes in Europe. The chain reactions 
starting with the reunification of Germany were followed by the end of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact and the massive transition to democracy in the 
former Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe. While in the late 90’s 
 
67 In 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall presented at Harvard University an outline 
of what has later became the Marshall Plan. The United States offered Europe up to $20 billion 
for relief after WWII. For the first time, European nations had to cooperate with each other and act 
as a single economic unit.  
68 Robert Kuttner, “Neocons Fret over Tilt with Europe”, The Boston Globe, February 2005. 
69 Timothy Garden, “The Future of European-American Relations”, the Centre for Defense 
Studies in London, 2004, available online at: 
http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/2004/040303indi.html. Accessed 12 April\2005. 
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there was some concern about the future of NATO70 without a clear enemy, the 
instability stemming from the break up of the former Yugoslavia gave plenty of 
work for Alliance forces.  
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the spirit of solidarity that 
made Europeans affirm ”we are all Americans”71 was palpable and unified the 
two sides of the Atlantic. The universal European reaction to those attacks was 
one of sympathy for America and horror at the outrage. Yet, by the end of 2002 
the U.S. and Europe seemed further apart than they were before.72  
The transatlantic partnership was critically jeopardized by the U.S. 
unilateral decision to start the war in Iraq. France's vow to veto a motion 
authorizing war on Iraq did not prevent the U.S. and Britain from launching an 
attack without backing from the United Nations (UN), plunging the Atlantic 
alliance and the EU into deep crisis. Hence, even before the first shots were 
fired, collateral damage had been brought to institutions like the UN, NATO and 
EU, who have been the foundations of Western stability since 1945. 
The Iraq crisis has split Europe into a pro-American camp led by Tony 
Blair of Britain, Jose Maria Aznar of Spain and Silvio Berlusconi of Italy and an 
anti-war camp led by Jacques Chirac of France and German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder. Moreover, the candidate countries due to join NATO and the EU in 
the 2004 enlargement wave have sided with Washington, drawing a bitter French 
rebuke and raising the prospect of a more pro-American tilt in an enlarged EU25 
bloc.73  
 
70 The Alliance has redefined its Strategic Concept in the Washington Summit of 1999. 
71 Jean-Marie Colombani, “We are all Americans”, Le Monde, Paris, September 2001, 
available online at: http://www.worldpress.org/1101we_are_all_americans.htm. Accessed 19 
March 2005. 
72 Charles Grant, "Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations.", Transatlantic 
Internationale Politik, 2/2003, available online at: 
http://www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Internationale%20Sicherheitspolitik/GASP/Analysen/%22S
ecurity%20Challenges%20in%20Transatlantic%20Relations.%22.html. Accessed 20 April 2005. 
73 Gustav Lindstrom (ed.) “Shift or Rift; Assessing U.S.-EU Relations after Iraq”, European 
Institute for Security Studies, Transatlantic Book 2003, available online at: http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/bk2003.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2005.  
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The present concentration of power in the U.S. is unprecedented, leading 
to a uni-polar world. As the British scholar Timothy Garton Ash observes, the 
U.S. “has too much power for anyone’s good, including its own.”74 This U.S. lead 
is unchallenged by any past cases of global powers. As Paul Kennedy noted:  
Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. I have 
returned to all of the statistics over the past 500 years... and no other nation 
comes close.75
American hegemony is resting on two unchallengeable pillars. First is the 
control of global economic markets seconded by the military power and 
particularly the ability to project that power to all corners of the globe. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the new enlarged EU has become a 
global trader with interests around the world. Having about 456.4 million 
inhabitants76, EU produces nowadays a GDP of the same order as the U.S. 
Therefore, it was long foreseen as inevitable that relationships would have 
to change and that Europe was going to challenge the U.S. hegemony.77  In this 
respect, Samuel P. Huntington of Harvard University predicted that the 
coalescing of the EU would be “the single most important move” in a worldwide 
reaction against American hegemony and would produce a “truly multipolar” 
twenty-first century.”78  
What Europe really seeks is not to overcome the U.S. military might, but to 
oppose it. In this respect, even the French critic Hubert Védrine has stopped 
talking about counterbalancing the U.S., declaring  
 
74 Timothy Garton Ash, “The Peril of Too Much Power”, New York Times, 9 April 2002, 
available online at: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/ash.htm. Accessed 23 April 2005. 
75 Paul Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers” Vintage, 1989. 
76 On 1 January 2004, the population of the EU25 was 456.4 million and that of the euro 
zone 308.4 million. The EU25 accounts for 7.2% of the world population being ahead of the 
United States with 4.6% (292 million people). From: Eurostat “European demography in 2003“, 
available at: http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_PUBLIC/3-31082004-BP/EN/3-31082004-
BP-EN.PDF. Accessed 19 April 2005. 
77 Ronald Asmus, P Everts and P Isernia, “Across the Atlantic and the Political Aisle: The 
Double Divide in U.S.-European Relations”, Transatlantic Trends 2004. 
78 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, March-April 1999. 
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there is no reason for the Europeans to match a country that can 
fight four wars at once. It was one thing for Europe in the 1990s to 
increase its collective expenditures on defense from $150 billion 
per year to $180 billion when the United States was spending $280 
billion per year. But now the United States is heading toward 
spending as much as $500 billion per year, and Europe has not the 
slightest intention of keeping up.79
1. Shared Values and Preferred Economic Ties 
The EU and the U.S. have a common belief in a democratic government, 
human rights and market economics. Overall, despite occasional differences 
between them, vital economic ties bind the U.S. and Europe, which also have 
common security interests. Beyond the occurrence of isolated political 
disagreements, the Iraq crisis has had no effect on the flow of trade and 
investment between the U.S. and Europe.  
The EU and the U.S. businesses and economies are increasingly 
interconnected, and it is often difficult to distinguish between a U.S. and EU 
company. Nowadays for example, U.S. firms have European affiliates that are 
treated as EU companies, and European firms manufacture in the U.S. - hence 
when the U.S. economy prospers, Europe also benefits and vice-versa. 
Therefore, it is in the mutual interest to see the transatlantic relationship not as a 
competitive one, but as a complementary one.80  
Today, the U.S. and the EU together account for 40 percent of world 
trade, being each other's most important trading partner. Preserving this 
relationship is essential to their prosperity and growth. Moreover, 59 percent of 
incoming and 79 percent of outgoing foreign direct investment originates from the 
transatlantic area.81
 
79 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness” Policy Review, No. 113, July 2002, available online 
at: http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html. Accessed 17 April 2005. 
80 Ambassador Schnabel, “On the Future of U.S.-EU Relations”, March 2004, available 
online at: http://www.coleurop.be/content/news/speeches/Speech%20Schnabel.pdf. Accessed 21 
April 2005. 
81 The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, New challenges for 
transatlantic security cooperation, Dec. 2004, available online at: http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1877.html. Accessed 9 March 2005. 
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The combined transatlantic workforce of associate companies on both 
Atlantic shores is greater than 12 million people. About 60 percent of research 
and development (R&D) undertaken by American foreign affiliates is carried out 
in Europe. European companies' expenditures in the U.S. are also very 
substantial.82
The U.S. and the EU are both partners and competitors. Consequently, 
their attitudes differ on several issues. Some areas of transatlantic disagreement 
such as steel, the Foreign Sales Corporations83, or the Byrd Amendment84, or 
aerospace have already been subject to rulings by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). Other disputes (Galileo/GPS) have been resolved or are in the process 
of being resolved, while yet others continually present difficulties (agricultural 
exports, imports of genetically modified organisms or hormone-treated meat).  
One particular area of significant competition between the U.S. and 
Europe is that of space and defense equipment technologies, which are essential 
for maintaining strategic autonomy and the technological edge of a regional or 
world power. In aeronautics in particular, the U.S. is currently raising questions 
about the bilateral agreement governing direct and indirect subsidies to Boeing 
and Airbus. The dispute has reached the WTO for mitigation.  
The American defense market is relatively closed, and technology transfer 
rules are highly restrictive.85  Still, across the Atlantic, intensified efforts are made 
to strengthen European armaments cooperation and improve European industrial 
competitiveness, with the aim being to bridge the capabilities gap.  
 
82 Daniel Hamilton & Joseph Quinlan, "Partners in prosperity: The changing geography of the 
transatlantic economy", Centre for Transatlantic Relations, SAIS, Washington, 2004. 
83 The Foreign Sales Corporations regulations to encourage American exports provide for the 
profits of the overseas affiliates of U.S. firms to be exempt from taxation, a practice condemned 
by the WTO. 
84 The Byrd Amendment allows the distribution of anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties to the 
companies that take their case to the authorities. The European Union takes the view that such 
redistribution is an illegal and hidden subsidy to American producers. 
85 "Britain warns U.S. of arms retaliation". The Financial Times, 30 July 2004. 
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An opportunity for increased transatlantic cooperation in defense was the 
consolidation of the U.S. defense industry in the 1990s. It reduced the number of 
domestic defense companies so sharply that for some products, only one U.S. 
manufacturer now exists. The Pentagon has been forced to widen the field of 
bidders to keep costs down.  
For example, in the market for airliners, Boeing is the last domestic maker 
of wide-body jets. This is forcing the Pentagon to consider Europe's Airbus if it 
wants a competition.  
With the Pentagon's budget squeezed by war costs and deficit concerns, 
military leaders are increasingly willing to buy a foreign product rather than pay 
more to develop a U.S. alternative. The Pentagon is increasingly shopping 
overseas for its weapons. This puts an end to a long made-in-America tradition 
that assured U.S. defense contractors of nearly exclusive sales to their best 
customer.  
The Navy's recent selection of a British-Italian design for the President's 
next helicopter demonstrated the breadth of the move toward foreign suppliers. 
Furthermore, the new openness raises the prospect that the Air Force will 
seriously entertain a European bid to replace its refueling tanker planes after a 
multibillion contract with Boeing collapsed last year in an ethics scandal at the 
company. Also, on the horizon is an Army decision on whether to replace the 
M16 rifle, designed by Connecticut-based Colt Defense LLC, with a German-
designed gun. 
The bottom line is that the overseas purchases of the Pentagon have 
enormous positive effects on the dynamics of the transatlantic partnership. Like 
its counterpart in the U.S., the European defense industry has consolidated and 
developed  expertise,  and  it  is  aggressively  pursuing  work with the Pentagon,  
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which is “still flush with cash compared with their nations' defense 
departments.”86  Nevertheless, foreign governments may be more willing to buy 
U.S. products. 
2. Sources of Transatlantic Tensions 
Differences of approach and sometimes-opposed views are to be found 
on both sides of the Atlantic. Cultural differences influence styles of governance 
and their internal policies with respect to carrying weapons, the death penalty, 
genetically modified organisms, customs barriers, the role of religion or the 
appropriate size of a social security system.87 There have always been 
differences but, during the Iraq crisis, they have been deliberately politicized.  
Critics maintain that the U.S. tends to ignore the concerns of the rest of 
the world, setting standards of right and wrong that align with U.S. interests.88 
Understandably, after 9/11, Americans are focused largely on the global war 
against terrorism. But this has strengthened the influence of the hardliners in the 
U.S. administration and reduced America’s willingness to consult its allies. Thus, 
Europeans often take a different line from the U.S. over arms control, 
international organizations, the environment and wider trade issues.  
The U.S. and Europe are fundamentally different today. Their mindsets 





86 Renae Merle. “Pentagon’s Global View; U.S. Increasingly Looks Abroad for Competitive 
Defense Contracts”, The Washington Post, March 2005, available online at: 
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April 2005. 
87 T. R. Reid, “The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of the 
American Supremacy”, The Penguin Press, New York, 2004. 
88 Daniel Brumberg, “Hegemony or Leadership”, Harvard International Review, 2004, 
available online at: http://www.ceip.org/files/publications/2003-04-01-brumberg-HIR.asp. 
Accessed 17 April 2005.  
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On the all-important question of power - the efficacy of power, the 
morality of power, the desirability of power - American and 
European perspectives are diverging. […] That is why on the major 
strategic and international questions today, Americans are from 
Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and 
understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is 
not transitory.89
a. Differences on International Policy 
In the late 1990s, transatlantic relations were characterized by 
intense economic relations yet weak political contacts. However, an effective 
U.S.-European political partnership, across a wide range of policy areas, is 
essential to global order and the world economy. In this context, the public 
diplomacy goal of the President Bush's trip to Europe early this year, was “an 
opportunity to speak to the peoples of Europe”90 and a clear intention to heal the 
transatlantic rift. 
The arguments about economic issues such as steel and farm 
subsidies were nothing new, but disagreements regarding foreign and defense 
policy, such as Iraq, Middle East, and recent divergences over lifting the arms 
embargo on China, have farther eroded the transatlantic relations.  
In recent years the European allies and the U.S. have disagreed 
over issues such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)91, the "Mine 
Ban Treaty."92 the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM)93, the Kyoto Protocol (to 
 
89 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness” Policy Review, No. 113, July 2002, available online 
at: http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html. Accessed 17 April 2005. 
90 Susan Milligan, “Bush softens touch in Europe, but not his policy”, Boston Globe third ed.,  
February 2005. 
91 The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been signed and ratified by all the EU member 
states. It was signed by the U.S. on 24 September 1996, but has still to be ratified. 
92 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Treaty of Ottawa) was signed and ratified by all EU 
member states, but not signed by the United States. 
93 The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was ratified by the U.S. on 3 August 1972, but on 14 
December 2001, President Bush announced the U.S.'s intention to withdraw.  
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limit greenhouse gas emissions) and the arms embargo94 on China. The United 
Nations International Criminal Court (ICC)95 is another issue generating heated 
opposition between Americans and Europeans.  
On the European side, policymakers have become frustrated by the 
tendency of the U.S. to act without consulting allies (i.e. the military campaign in 
Afghanistan and Iraq); by its reluctance to be constrained by international treaties 
and organizations (blocking the dialog in the Kyoto Protocol and disregarding UN 
or WTO provisions); and by its “enthusiasm for deploying the hard sort of 
power.”96 The European approach to these issues ranges from peacekeeping 
operations to increased economic aid, as well as other contributions to nation 
building.  
On the other side, American policymakers have found the 
Europeans parochial in their world-view. They were considered “slovenly in their 
reaction to the threat of WMD, and pathetic in their military capabilities.”97  
European and U.S. perceptions of the threat are very different. For 
their part, Europeans do not feel at war, focusing more on their integration 
process and economic development. Given the enormous and difficult agenda of 
integration, this European tendency to look inward is understandable. EU 
enlargement, the revision of the common economic and agricultural policies, the 
question of national sovereignty versus supranational governance, the so-called 
 
94 Within the EU Council, European nations have begun discussing the possibility of a 
removal of the embargo. The U.S. criticizes Europeans for being willing to consider sacrificing 
human rights to commercial ambition and is roundly opposed to such a step. It fears China could 
use European technology transfers to develop weapons, which might then be used against the 
Americans, particularly in the event of a conflict involving Taiwan. The Americans are also afraid 
of the spread of an arms race in the region. 
95 The Court was established in 1998. It is a permanent international tribunal with universal 
jurisdiction, competent to try anyone suspected of crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and crimes of aggression. The United States, in principle, opposed to a supranational 
court with authority to prosecute its nationals, fearing also that the Court would become 
politicized. 
96 Charles Grant, “Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations” in Transatlantic 
Internationale Politik, No.2/2003 available online at: 
http://www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Internationale%20Sicherheitspolitik/GASP/Analysen/%22S
ecurity%20Challenges%20in%20Transatlantic%20Relations.%22.html. Accessed 29 March 2005. 
97 Ibid. 
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democracy deficit, the jostling of the large European powers, the dissatisfaction 
of the smaller powers, the establishment of a new European constitution - all of 
these present serious and unavoidable challenges. 
Additionally, European hardliners consider that the Bush 
administration tends to reduce complex global problems to the neat template of 
the war against terror, conflating terrorism with weapons proliferation and the 
danger coming from rogue states. Their argument is that each of these are 
serious and interrelated problems, but they are analytically distinct and require 
adequate policy responses.98  
According to recent polls, a growing majority in Europe is openly 
critical of U.S. policies and desires a reassessment of the type and extent of 
Europe's partnership with the United States. Opinion polls presented in Figure 3 
show an increased tendency in the U.S. (60 percent) towards closer relations 
with the EU, whereas in Europe the trend seems to move in the opposite 
direction, with 71 percent of Europeans believing that the EU should become a 
superpower.  
 
98 Charles Grant, “Transatlantic rift: How to bring the two sides together”, Centre for 
European Reform, London, July 2003, available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p467_transatlantic_rift_cg.pdf. Accessed 10 March 2005. 
 
Figure 3.   Should the U.S. and Europe become closer or move farther apart?99 
 
At the same time, only 28 percent of Europeans, as compared to 54 
percent of Americans, believe that military might is the best way of keeping the 
peace.100 Thus, Europeans are not willing to shift significant resources from 
social programs to military programs.  
b. Different Approaches to Security 
Some transatlantic security challenges are not new, but in the 
present international context they have become more pressing as ever before. 
The danger of proliferation among states of WMD is matched by the danger of 
the use of those weapons for terrorist purposes.  
When confronted with international crises, especially those in the 
Middle  East  or in the Balkans, the goals of peace and stability are ones that are  
                                            
99 From: Transatlantic Trends 2004, German Marshall Fund, available online at: 
http://www.transatlantictrends.org/apps/gmf/ttweb2004.nsf/0/D154546D26BFF48B85256F090066
9ED1/$file/Newest+Report.pdf. Accessed 11 April 2005. 
100 Assembly of WEU, The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, 
New challenges for transatlantic security cooperation, available online at: http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1877.html. Accessed 9 March 2005. 
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shared by Americans and Europeans alike. The U.S. and Europe have common 
interests and the same priorities in terms of security and external action, aiming 
at:  
• Maintaining the democratic traditions and shared basic values of 
tolerance and support for civil liberties in the face of religious 
fanaticism;  
• Eradicating, or at least neutralizing, the common threat to security 
and prosperity;  
• Helping other parts of the world develop democratic institutions and 
advanced economies.101 
However, the means advocated for achieving these goals, at times, 
differ from one Atlantic shore to the other. The main difference between the two 
Atlantic shores is recourse to force.  
There is a striking difference between the U.S. National Security 
Strategy of 2002, which reflects an ideology based on preemption and 
preeminence102, and the EU's Security Strategy of 2003, which speaks about 
preventive action based on effective multilateralism and partnership under the 
UN framework.103 While the American doctrine is externally oriented on “foreign 
threats” such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and 
rogue states, The European doctrine looks more at “challenges,” such as ethnic 
conflict, migration, organized crime, poverty and environmental degradation, but 
do not exclude the use of force. 
As the EU has tried to move towards a common foreign and 
security policy, these differences have widened. However, as Stephen Everts 
mentions, “the key difference is less a matter of culture and philosophy than of 
 
101 Assembly of WEU, The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, 
New challenges for transatlantic security cooperation, available online at: http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2004/1877.html. Accessed 9 March 2005. 
102 The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, 
Washington, September 2002, available online at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
Accessed 9 March 2005. 
103 European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, December 
2003, available online at: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. Accessed 19 March 
2005. 
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capability.”104 This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its 
capabilities and increase its coherence.105  
 
104 Steven Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in 
Transatlantic Foreign Policy” Centre for European Reform, Working Paper, February 2001. 
105 European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, December 
2003, available online at: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. Accessed 19 March 
2005.  
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NATO-EU RELATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The transatlantic alliance has had to adjust its objectives and means to the 
new security challenges. This chapter discusses the EU’s endeavor to develop a 
highly effective common security and defense policy. On this background, the 
development of the European Security and Defence Policy is one of the most 
remarkable events of the integration process in the late 90s.  
Since the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, a breathtaking 
dynamic was set free, starting with the Franco-British Summit of St. Mâlo in 
1998, the European Councils of Cologne, Helsinki 1999, Feira (2000), the Treaty 
of Nice in December 2000, the European Council of Laeken 2001, the NATO 
Summit in Prague 2002, the European Council in Brussels 2003, and the NATO 
Summit in Istanbul in 2004. A new institutional set-up was defined, military and 
civilian capabilities for crisis management were established, and arrangements 
with NATO and other organizations were taken into consideration. 
This chapter addresses some of the main aspects of the NATO-EU 
relation regarding the controversies of collaboration versus competition, power 
versus burden sharing and the quest for capabilities buildup in EU. 
The parallel enlargement processes in NATO and the EU had a profound 
impact on one another, given that they both reach the heart of some fundamental 
questions, ranging from trade liberalization and globalization to the nature of 
security in 21st century Europe. Done properly and in a coordinated fashion, the 
NATO-EU “Double enlargement” can only strengthen both the EU and the 
transatlantic partnership, increasing the capabilities available to NATO and the 
EU to deter or respond to crises. Done poorly, the enlargement might create new 
tensions between allies and lead to their drifting apart. 
 
 
B. FROM ESDI TO ESDP 
One huge step in the development of the EU towards a federation was the 
idea of a common defense. The EU's nascent foreign and security policy was first 
enshrined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Subsequent steps led to the 
establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as the second pillar of 
the EU.  
The EU is an umbrella organization106 based on three pillars, as presented 
in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   The three pillars of the European Union.107 
 
The failure to cope effectively with the Balkans crisis in the 1990s had a 
dual effect on the EU. It forced the EU leaders to realize that they need to 
harmonize their foreign policies and that an effective military force would be 
required to support a common policy.  
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Institutions”, European Commission Directorate, June 2003, available online at: 
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The Europeans also realized that without NATO support they would have 
not been able to wage a campaign of military significance. Consequently, they 
acknowledged that their first need was a Rapid Reaction Force to be deployable 
in a short time, in case of a crisis.  
Hence, at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, EU 
member states set themselves a military capability target known as the Headline 
Goal.108 It projected a force of 60,000 troops, deployable in 60 days and 
sustainable for a year in support of the “Petersberg Tasks.” 
The “Petersberg Tasks” were established in June 1992 at the Ministerial 
Council of the Western European Union (WEU) held at the Petersberg Hotel. On 
this occasion, the WEU member states declared that the WEU would serve “as 
the defense component of the EU and as the means to strengthen the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance,” and restated their readiness to make available 
military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for 
military tasks conducted under the authority of the WEU.  
Moreover, the different types of military tasks that the WEU can undertake 
were defined:  
apart from contributing to the collective defence in accordance with 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, military units of WEU Member States may be 
employed for: 
• humanitarian and rescue tasks;  
• peace-keeping tasks;  
• tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking.109  
 
108 The Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, “The EU headline goal 
and the NATO Response Force”, Assembly of WEU, June 2003, available online at: 
http://www.assembly-weu.org/en/documents/sessions_ordinaires/rpt/2003/1825.html. Accessed 
15 March 2005. 
109 WEU Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, 19 June 1992, “On Strengthening 
WEU’s Operational Role”, available online at: www.weu.int/eng/comm/92-petersberg.htm. 
Accessed 11 February 2005. 
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These tasks are today expressly included in Article 17.2 of the Treaty on 
European Union and form an integral part of the ESDP.110
Two obstacles hindered the implementation of this declaration. First is the 
overlap between NATO and the EU, in that both organizations have expressed a 
willingness to undertake all of the “Petersberg Tasks” missions. Second, the 
Petersberg tasks formula does not make a clear distinction between “upper” and 
“lower” level tasks as the relevant NATO documents do. According to the AJP-
01(b) and AJP3.4.1’PSO’ NATO documents, lower order operations are basically 
noncombatant operations and upper level operations imply the employment of 
military combat means. By contrast, EU member states consider the lower level 
Petersberg Tasks “neither politically sensitive nor militarily demanding.”111  
Parallel to the European development, NATO underwent a process of 
profound reform since the early 1990s to adjust to the changed political, military 
and strategic environment. As early as 1990, the NATO's London and Paris 
Declarations proposed cooperation to their former adversaries, the ex-members 
of the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, in the 1991 Strategic Concept, NATO 
decided formally to add dialogue and cooperation with former adversaries as 
another task of the Alliance in addition to collective defense.  
In 1992, NATO offered the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE) and the UN support in peacekeeping activities. At its 1994 
Brussels summit, NATO reaffirmed itself to be in-principle open to new members, 
adopted the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and started a restructuring of 
its command structures to meet the new challenges of conflict prevention and 
crisis management. As an institutional framework, the North Atlantic Cooperation 
 
110 Martin Ortega, ““Petersberg Tasks, and missions for the EU military forces”, Institute for 
Security Studies, February 2005, available online at: http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/04-mo.pdf. 
Accessed 12 April 2005. 
111 “Achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals”, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s Collage 
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Council (NACC) was founded and succeeded in 1997 by the wider Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC) with currently 46 allies and partner members.112
1. Collaboration versus Competition  
With the stronger Europe position, the relation between NATO and the 
European defense policy inevitably became a key issue. The establishment of a 
European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) caucus within NATO, which 
lately evolved into a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as the 
second pillar of the EU, was intended to ensure that the European efforts to play 
a greater role in the international security arena would be pursued within the 
Alliance framework, and not independently.  With respect to the terminology, 
NATO prefers to use the term ESDI. By contrast, the EU has formally shifted at 
the December 1999 Helsinki European Council to using the term ESDP to stress 
that this was a “policy” of the EU, and not just an “identity” derived from NATO.113
The project of developing an independent ESDP, launched by the 
Cologne European Council in June 1999 as a distinctive part of the EU’s CFSP, 
was supposed to be one of the most important by-products of European 
integration. As stated by the European Security Strategy (ESS), the role of ESDP 
is to 
complete and thus strengthen the EU's external ability to act 
through the development of civilian and military capabilities for 
international conflict prevention and crisis management.114
Visible progress towards closer military cooperation and integration has 
been hampered by two factors. First was the divide, in views, between the EU 
members. On the background of its “special relationship” with the U.S., Britain 
has supported an ESDP complementary to NATO, whereas France and 
Germany tended to project it more as a substitute or even rival to NATO.   
112 “EAPC Member Countries”, NATO, Euro Atlantic Partnership Council, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc-cnt.htm. Accessed 23 April 2005. 
113 Robert E. Hunter, “The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or 
Competitor?”, Rand Publications, 2002. 
114 European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, December 
2003, available online at: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. Accessed 19 March 
2005. 
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The French president Jacques Chirac called for a stronger EU to confront 
Washington. He maintained America's assertive policies made it crucial for 
Europe to pull closer together as a single power bloc. The French foreign minister 
Michel Barnier argued, "Our world needs several powers. We are in the process 
of gathering the pieces and the will to become another power.”115
Second, the position of the U.S. on the ongoing ESDP project has always 
been ambivalent.116 It ranged between welcoming the efforts of the Europeans to 
improve their capabilities and expressing concerns with regards to the ESDP’s 
potentially divisive effect on NATO. The first Bush Administration made it clear 
that “such one-sided European experiments [as ESDI] could put NATO at risk.”117  
Skepticism on Capitol Hill in Washington DC was based on two envisioned 
scenarios: either ESDP will do so little that it will not make up for shortfalls in 
NATO capabilities, or it will try to do so much, at the expense of NATO primacy, 
that NATO would become less effective, and U.S. influence in Europe would be 
dramatically weakened.118  
Moreover, the gap between the proud rhetoric with which the Europeans 
launched the ESDP and its hitherto unimpressive performance fueled the 
argument of those Americans who claimed that the EU will never be a serious 
global player and is “nothing more than an economic club.”119  Thus, for the most 
part of a decade, each new development in the creation of ESDP and in NATO’s 
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response to it has been attended by “a high degree of misunderstanding, at times 
even mistrust, often amounting to a proper dialogue of the deaf.”120  
Finally, at NATO’s Berlin and Brussels foreign and defense ministerial 
meetings, the compromise solution also known as “the grand bargain”121 was 
negotiated.  It was agreed that NATO would help to facilitate the creation of 
ESDP, but not as a completely independent entity, likely to rival NATO and drain 
its resources. Instead, ESDP would be designed as a European caucus within 
NATO. Moreover, the U.S. agreed that some of its own assets122 could be made 
available to the EU. 
Originally, the NATO-EU relation was projected based on two critical 
concepts. First was the principle of “separable but not separate” military 
capabilities that could be employed by NATO and the EU. The second principle 
implicitly recognized “NATO’s primacy” and acknowledged that there cannot be 
“two NATOs.” one for Article 5 and one for non-Article 5 tasks.123
From the American point of view, in order for the ESDP to be successful, it 
must not interfere with the role of NATO:  
We believe the ESDP should remain focused on conducting crisis 
management outside the EU's borders and not seek to undertake common 
defense. That is NATO's responsibility.124  
 
120 Charles Grant, “Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations” in Transatlantic 
Internationale Politik, No.2/2003 available online at: 
http://www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Internationale%20Sicherheitspolitik/GASP/Analysen/%22S
ecurity%20Challenges%20in%20Transatlantic%20Relations.%22.html. Accessed 29 March 2005. 
121 Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, NATO Press 
Communiqué, Brussels, June 1996. 
122 NATO’s ownership of military goods is limited to headquarters, command, control and 
communications facilities, as well as to some logistics (like the Pipelining System), and to 17 
Airborne Warning and Control Surveillance aircraft (AWACS). When deciding to undertake a 
military operation, it rather call upon national contributions. 
123 Robert E. Hunter, “The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or 
Competitor?”, Rand Publications, 2002. 
124 Bach William, “European Defence: Bridging the Capabilities Gap”, RUSI Journal, 
December 2003, Available online at: 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3727/is_200312/ai_n9322957. Accessed 23 April 
2005. 
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By this token, ESDP should not be designed as a substitute to NATO, but 
rather be oriented toward stabilization and peace keeping operations. In other 
words, the ESDP should not address issues of hard security.  
A significant turn in the development of ESDP and in the traditional British 
policy took place in December 1998 at the Franco-British summit in St. Mâlo. 
When the British Prime Minister Tony Blair “crossed the European defence in 
Rubicon.” it set the entire ESDP into motion.125  
The reasons behind this dramatic change in the United Kingdom’s policy 
on EU defense matters were complex and manifold. Undoubtedly, they were 
rooted in the interest of providing the UK a more significant role in EU affairs. 
Franco-German domination in EU affairs gained a new impetus with the 
introduction of the EMU and the euro, as well as through the implementation of 
the Schengen regime. Thus, more active British participation in the EU’s CFSP 
was intended to compensate for Britain’s non-participation in the EMU and the 
Schengen Agreements.126  
At the semiannual NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels, Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright gave the first, quick U.S. response to St. Mâlo by 
reaffirming  enthusiastic U.S. support for such actions that enhance European 
capabilities while, at the same time, setting out the U.S. position in the so-called 
“three D’s.”127 In the American view, the design of ESDP should avoid: 
unnecessary “duplication” of existing NATO efforts and capabilities, “decoupling” 
 
125 Jolyon Howorth. “European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?” WEU 
Institute for Security Studies. Chaillot Paper 43. 
126 Pál Dunay, “U.S.-EU Relations after the Introduction of the Euro and the Reinvention of 
European Security and Defence”, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Occasional Paper Series 
2000. 
127 Remarks by the Secretary Madeline Albright at the North Atlantic Council ministerial 
meeting, Brussels, December, 1998. available online at: 
http://www.fas.org/man/nato/offdocs/us_97/97121611_wpo.html. Accessed 12 April 2005. 
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of Europe's security from that of its North American Allies, and “discrimination” 
against those Allies who are not EU members.128  
Paraphrasing this approach, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson 
has come up with the “three I's" formulation, which might better reflect the recent 
developments in the NATO-EU relations. These stand for “indivisibility” of the 
trans-Atlantic link, “improvement” of capabilities, and “inclusiveness” of all Allies 
by parallel enlargement processes. 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 against the U.S., shortly followed by the 
disunity over Iraq, had a tremendous effect on the ESDP development. They 
have effectively neutered EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana and hampered 
the ongoing efforts to draft the constitution for an enlarged EU and build a closer 
common foreign and security policy. According to Maartje Rutten:  
not only does it largely de-rail the ESDP plans (strategy, goals, 
geographic limits and character of possible operations, military and 
civil means, etc) but international anti-terrorism coalition-building 
and the military campaign in Afghanistan have put EU commonality 
under significant strain, putting the CFSP/ESDP acquis in 
danger.129  
The EU-NATO Declaration on the ESDP in December 2002 provides a 
formal basis for cooperation between the two organizations in the areas of crisis 
management and conflict prevention. The EU and NATO agreed on a framework 
for permanent relations, allowing the EU access to NATO assets for crisis 
management. The declaration is intended to ensure that the crisis management 
activities of the EU and NATO are mutually reinforcing, but preserves the 
autonomy   of   each.    Specifically,   the   EU   agrees   to   the   “fullest possible  
 
128 Strobe Talbott, “The State of the Alliance: An American Perspective” NATO Speeches, 
available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s991215c.htm. Accessed 11 April, 
2005. 
129 Maartje Rutten, “From Nice to Larken; European Defence Core Documents”, Vol II, 
Challiot Papers, No. 51, April 2002, available online at: http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai51e.pdf. 
Accessed 20 April 2005. 
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involvement” of non-EU members of NATO within ESDP and NATO agrees to 
support ESDP by giving the EU “assured access to NATO's planning 
capabilities.” 130
Along the NATO-EU relation, both sides have learned over many years of 
trial and error to work effectively together in critical and unprecedented ways. 
The controversy over their cooperation versus competition is highly contextual 
and far from having a simple answer. In fact, it is an all but false conflicting 
relation, since cooperation does not exclude competition. On the contrary, the 
two might have positive effects reinforcing each other. 
It is almost a cliché that relations between ESDP and NATO are of 
fundamental importance to the future direction of both bodies. ESDP needs 
NATO to provide access both to military instruments and to planning facilities. 
NATO needs ESDP because a coordinated and stronger European capacity is of 
greater use to the Alliance than a disparate and uncoordinated one.131  
Currently, there are two important aspects that remain to be resolved in 
the transatlantic partnership. They refer to the longstanding dispute over power 
versus burden sharing and the quest for EU to build up capabilities.  
2. Power versus Burden Sharing  
In the late 1980s, during the Cold War, the U.S. was spending around 7 
percent of its GDP on defense. Today, it spends a little over 3 percent on 
defense with the perspective of increasing to 4 percent, meaning a defense 
budget in excess of $500 billion per year.132  By comparison, average European 
defense budgets have gradually fallen below 2 percent of GDP. 
 
 
130 Jean-Yves Haine, “From Larken to Copenhagen; European Defence Core Documents”, 
Vol III, Challiot Papers, No. 57, February 2003, available online at: http://www.iss-
eu.org/chaillot/chai57e.pdf. Accessed 20 April 2005. 
131 Jolyon Howorth, Saint Malo Plus Five: An Interim Assessment of ESDP”, Policy Papers 
No. 7, November 2003. 
132 Robert Kagan, “Power and Weakness” Policy Review, No. 113, July 2002, available 
online at: http://www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html. Accessed 17 April 2005. 
After 9/11, the U.S. military expenditures followed an upward trend, 
reaching the high levels of the Korean War, Vietnam War and the Reagan 
Buildup in the late 90’s. The U.S. spending has risen from $296 billion in 1997 to 
$336 billion in 2002 and $379 billion in 2003.133
In Figure 5, it is easy to observe the pattern under which high military 
buildup occurs in the U.S. at approximately every 20 years. This frequency might 
be one of the reasons why American weapons systems are at least a generation 
of technology ahead of its allies and around two generations ahead of any likely 
state adversaries.  
 
Figure 5.   U.S. military spending, Fiscal Years 1945-2008 134 
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133 Thalif Deen, “U.S. Accounts for Global Surge in Military Spending” August 2004, available 
online at: http://www.antiwar.com/ips/deen.php?articleid=3319. Accessed 15 April 2005. 
134 From: The Defense Monitor No. 5, Center for Defense Information, December 2003, 
available online at: http://www.cdi.org/news/defense-monitor/dm.pdf. Accessed 20 April 2005. 
Moreover, this gap seems to be growing, thus raising serious concerns 
about interoperability with the Allies.135  Some experts argue that the difference in 
the technological level of the U.S. versus European armies is such that if Europe 
does not catch up quickly, the two militaries will not even be able to 
“communicate” properly.  
Nowadays the U.S. accounts for about half of world military spending. In 
other words, it is spending nearly as much as the rest of the world combined. 
This huge difference is shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.   Global military spending comparisons 2002.136 
 
135 P.W. Singer, “New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO and Beyond”, 
Weltpolitik, January 2003, available online at: 
http://www.brook.edu/views/speeches/singer/20030115.htm. Accessed 21 April 2005  
136 From: The Defense Monitor No. 5, Center for Defense Information, December, 2003, 
available online at: http://www.cdi.org/news/defense-monitor/dm.pdf. Accessed 20 April 2005. 
In Table 2 the EU defense budgets from 2001 through 2004 in current 
U.S. dollars, and EU defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP from 2001 
through 2003 are presented.  
 
Table 2.   EU and U.S. Comparative Defense Budgets and Defense 




                                            
137 After: Burkard Schmitt, ”Defense Expenditure” Institute for Security Studies, February, 
2005, available online at: http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf.  Accessed 20 April 2005. 
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The data shows growing defense budgets in many of the EU countries. 
However, this trend must be interpreted with care. A comparison between the 
three largest spenders, using euros and pounds sterling instead of U.S. dollars, 
reveals that most of the apparent increases can be attributed to currency 
fluctuations. Over the period 2001-2004, the German defense budget actually 
remained constant, while in France and Britain, budgets grew at a much lower 
rate than the dollar figures suggest. 
Irrespective of how budgets are calculated, it is clear that European 
defense spending trails far behind that of the U.S. In 2004, the U.S. spent more 
than twice as much on defense as the 25 EU members combined. By 2009, the 
U.S. defense budget is expected to surpass half a trillion dollars, signaling an 
even more widening transatlantic spending gap. 
Moreover, U.S. defense spending is geared towards more modern and 
lethal weapons, as the U.S. spends about $26,800 in defense R&D per soldier, 
as opposed to about $4,000 in the EU.138 As a result of this investment in 
extraordinarily expensive technology, the U.S. has full control of sea, air and 
ground. It is extremely unlikely that Europe can come even close to such a 
powerful military given the already heavy burden of its public sector.  
Defense spending is spread very unevenly across EU countries. The six 
most important arms-producing countries (the so-called LoI countries)139 cover 




138 Kori Schake, “Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU Reliance on U.S. Military Assets”, 
Centr for European Reform, Working Paper, London 2002, Available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/cerwp12_cd.pdf. Accessed 11 March 2005. 
139 Burkard Schmitt, ”European and Transatlantic Defence-Industrial Strategies”, European 
Institute for Security Studies, Paris, November 2002, available online at: 
http://www.eusec.org/schmitt.htm. Accessed 20 April 2005. The six major arms-producing 
European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Sweden) have established 
their own rules on transfers and exports for cooperative programmes that remain completely 
outside of the EU framework (the Letter of Intent, or LoI). 
On the other hand, the combined budget of the ten new member states is 
only about 5.8 percent of the former EU-15's budget. Even among the LoI 
countries, differences are significant, with the UK, France, Germany and Italy far 




Figure 7.   EU Defence Budgets 2004.140 
 
Finally, budget numbers do not tell the whole story. The structural 
differences between the U.S. and European defense markets play at least as 
important a role. Due to fragmented defense markets and disparate procurement 
policies, European countries are burdened by costly duplication. As a 
consequence, the EU as a whole receives much less value in exchange for its 
military spending than the U.S.  
Furthermore, the share of investment (procurement and R&D spending) in 
most EU countries is relatively low in comparison to operating costs. Figure 8 
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140 From: Burkard Schmitt, ”Defense Expenditure” European Institute for Security Studies, 
February, 2005, available online at: http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf. Accessed 20 April 
2005. 
illustrates the downward trend in R&D spending by 15 EU countries in 
comparison with the upward trend in the U.S. 
 
 
Figure 8.   Research and Development of U.S., LoI and the rest of the EU.141 
 
The data presented above show that at least in material terms, the U.S. 
has the ability to shoulder the burden of maintaining global security without much 
help from Europe. Despite unprecedented high budget deficits,142 the U.S. 
economy is strong enough to sustain its current military spending levels and its 
current global dominance far into the future.  
The fact that the U.S. is unlikely to reduce its power and that Europe is 
unlikely to increase more than marginally its own power or the will to use what 
power it has, might create premises for further increased transatlantic tensions. 
In this context, the debate on more burden sharing is a longstanding one. 
It became a cliché for American Euroskeptics to accuse the Europeans of being 
free riders on American-provided security. For their part, Europeans consider this 
charge inaccurate in the broader context. It is undeniable that European NATO 
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141 From: Burkard Schmitt, ”Defense Expenditure” European Institute for Security Studies, 
February, 2005, available online at: http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/11-bsdef.pdf. Accessed 20 April 
2005. 
142 “Bush administration records second-straight record gap”, Reuters, October 2004, 
available online at: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6249895/. Accessed 11 April 2005. The U.S. 
budget gap expanded to $412.55 billion in fiscal 2004. 
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members spend, together, only the equivalent of 66 percent of the U.S. defense 
budget. However, the real European contribution to the world’s security is far 
higher if all costs are considered.143
In the years after the Berlin Wall fell, three-quarters of Western economic 
and financial assistance to Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe came from the EU. Half of the international aid to the West Bank and 
Gaza from 1994 to 1997, designed to boost the Middle East peace process, 
came from Western Europe, in contrast to only 10 percent from the U.S.144 
Moreover, European contributions to international organizations and economic 
development in the poorest states of Africa and South Asia far exceed the 
shrinking U.S. share. 
The key issue remains the balance between U.S. support for ESDI (within 
NATO) versus European support for greater "autonomy" (under ESDP). From the 
EU perspective, power and burden sharing go hand in hand. If the EU is to 
develop its own military capability, it wants the power to decide when, where and 
how to use it.  
Washington, on the other hand, has put its emphasis on "burden" without 
"power" sharing. American concerns stem from the 1956 Suez crisis in which 
President Eisenhower was taken by surprise during an election year by British-
French-Israeli military actions taken against Egypt.145 The present fear is that the 
EU could, once again, act on its own without American knowledge or permission. 
Constant repetition of the claim that Europe should pay more is one of the 
most corrosive elements in American criticism. European governments are 
deeply conscious of the value of the American-led NATO framework and are far 
 
143 William Wallace & Jan Zielonka, “Misunderstanding Europe”, Foreign Affairs, New York, 
November/December 1998, available online at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19981101faessay1433/william-wallace-jan-
zielonka/misunderstanding-europe.html. Accessed 23 December 2004. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Tom Cooper, “Middle East Database” September 2003, available online at: 
http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_256.shtml. Accessed 19 April 2005. 
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from breaking the transatlantic link. Still, there is increasing irritation that what the 
U.S. really demands is that “the Europeans pay for U.S. hegemony.”146  
3. Bridging the Capabilities Gap 
As affirmed by the ESS, the EU is a global actor, ready to share in the 
responsibility for global security. With the adoption by the European Council in 
December 2003 of the European Security Strategy, the EU affirmed the role it 
wants to play in the world, supporting an international order based on effective 
multilateralism.147 The ESS has since become the framework for examining 
further developments in ESDP. The ESS is, in effect, a pre-strategic concept 
underlining the need for the EU to strengthen the ESDP and defining clear 
guidelines regarding why the EU will act, as well as when, how and where.148  
Currently, the EU’s ESDP faces two major and interrelated challenges: the 
insufficient defense budgets of the EU member states, and the capability gap 
between the EU member states and the U.S. With respect to the latest, many 
observers emphasize that there are three priorities in NATO's transformation and 
ESDP’s development: firstly capabilities, secondly capabilities and thirdly 
capabilities.149   
Concern about Europe’s military weakness came to the forefront in the 
1990s when it was unable to prevent civil war in the Balkans. It was long 
acknowledged that the failure to boost capabilities would not only damage 
 
146 William Wallace & Jan Zielonka, “Misunderstanding Europe”, Foreign Affairs, New York, 
November/December 1998, available online at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19981101faessay1433/william-wallace-jan-
zielonka/misunderstanding-europe.html. Accessed 23 December 2004. 
147 “European Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World”, Brussels, December 
2003, available online at: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. Accessed 19 March 
2005. 
148 Julian Lindley, “Europe’s Security and Defence in the 21st Century; The Future of the 
ESDP”, Centre for Politics and Security, Paris, 2004, available online at: http://www.assembly-
weu.org/en/presse/articles/ABC_final_inside.pdf. Accessed 19 April 2005. 
149 Speech by Dr. Michael Schaefer, “NATO and ESDP: Shaping the European Pillar of a 
Transformed Alliance" German Federal Foreign Office, 15 March 2004, available online at: 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_archiv?land_id=188&a_type=Speeches&
archiv_id=5500. Accessed 18 April 2005. 
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transatlantic relations, but also Europe. In this context, the establishment in 2004 
of the European Defence Agency was aimed at sustaining ESDP by supporting 
EU’s efforts in improving its defense capabilities.  
The initiatives from the newly created EDA represent the EU’s first step in 
military R&D. They are aimed at transforming the EU from being solely a political 
power, in charge of policies such as agriculture and trade, to a military one, 
capable of sending troops around the world to enforce a foreign policy agreed to 
by its member states. As declared by Nick Witney, the British chief executive of 
EDA: 
Europe does not have the defense capabilities that it ought to. I 
want to see what we can do to get more bang for the buck than is 
already provided and I am sure we can go a long way applying all 
the separate defense lines across Europe more coherently.  
[…] When you think that we have two million men and women 
under arms in Europe and you link that to €160 billion (£115 billion) 
of defense expenditure across Europe it suggests money is not 
being well spent.150
Moreover, because countries are duplicating armed forces, the EU has:  
too much of the old expensive platform assets. We probably have 
collectively too many fighter aircraft, too many naval hulls, too many 
battle tanks.151  
This reality is proved by the data in Table 3 below. It is clear that the 
disproportion in military spending between the U.S. and its allies is further 
reflected in the breakdown structure of their military capabilities. With the 
exception of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, all other Allies152 have 
modest capabilities, which pooled together, come close to the U.S. 
 
 
150 Anthony Browne, “High-tech Weapons help Europe close military gap with U.S.”, The 
Times, London, March 2005, available online at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,13509-
1506532,00.html. Accessed 23 April 2005. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Other NATO includes: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. 
Table 3.   Strength of the U.S. and Allies.153 
 
 
EU needs forces, which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable, 
making better use of available resources by pooling and sharing assets, where 
appropriate, and increasing the responsiveness of multinational forces. Thus, 
interoperability, deployability and sustainability are at the core of member states 
efforts and will be the driving factors of their headline goal. 
In the perspective of taking on new peacekeeping responsibilities, EU 
governments are becoming more ambitious in the types of soldiers and 
equipment their armed forces should have. In April 2004, European defense 
ministers agreed that, by 2007, the EU should be able to use nine battle groups, 
each consisting of 1,500 troops, and deploy them within two weeks.  
EU defense ministers have also signed up to capabilities in the Headline 
Goal 2010. This plan commits them to acquire various sorts of equipment, such 
as transport planes, unmanned aircraft and precision-guided missiles by 2010.154 
In a strategy to become a military superpower and close the defense technology 
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153 After: ”The Defense Monitor” No. 5, Center for Defense Information, December, 2003, 
available online at: http://www.cdi.org/news/defense-monitor/dm.pdf. Accessed 20 April 2005. 
154 “Implementing the defence aspects of the European Security Strategy: the Headline Goal 
2010”, European Security Review, No. 23, June 2004, available online at: http://www.isis-
europe.org/ftp/Download/ESR%2023-Headline%20Goal%202010.pdf. Accessed 9 April 2005. 
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gap with the U.S., EU is to develop its airlifting capabilities, unmanned drones, 
new armored vehicles and advanced communication systems.155
European defense capabilities have been severely hampered by the 
failure to exploit economies of scale, with the result that the U.S. defense 
spending achieves a far greater “bang for its buck.” In order to help close the 
capabilities gap between the U.S. and EU, a transatlantic industrial initiative, the 
so-called Transatlantic Industrial Proposed Solution (TIPS), was initiated by three 
consortiums: European Aeronautic Defence and Space (EADS), Galileo Avionica 
and Northrop Grumman.  
Their White Paper, addressed to NATO in April 2002, promotes a joint 
concept definition, an acceptable technology access matrix, a combined legal 
and business arrangement, integrated working groups and work share for the 
industry of all 19 NATO member states as well as guarantee of interoperability 
with national systems and re-use of high technology for national programs. TIPS 
declared that within the Atlantic Alliance, 54 companies are already showing their 
interest for this transatlantic defense cooperative program. This industrial 
initiative aims at a new approach for future transatlantic cooperation where 
Europeans should not just spend more money in military capabilities, but spend 
their money better.156
 
C. THE RISKS OF THE NATO-EU “DOUBLE ENLARGEMENT” 
The end of the Cold War gave new opportunities to both NATO and the 
EU  to  spread  east  and extend the economic, political and security benefits to a  
 
155 Anthony Browne, “High-tech Weapons help Europe close military gap with U.S.”, The 
Times, London, March 2005, available online at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,13509-
1506532,00.html. Accessed 23 April 2005. 
156 Nannette Buhl, “Reinventing Global Security”, NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace, 
Uithoorn, 2003.Vol.48, available online at: 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=1&did=538867781&SrchMode=1&sid=1&Fmt=4&VInst=P
ROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1114452328&clientId=11969. Accessed 15 
March 2005. 
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wider area. The 1999 and 2004 waves of NATO enlargement and the EU 
expansion from 15 to 25 members in 2004 represent a great step forward for 
peace and security.  
Despite intensified efforts, NATO and the EU have not yet formulated a 
coherent and concerted political-military strategy that thoroughly takes into 
consideration the rapidly changing parameters of post-Cold War European 
security. The expansion of NATO and EU membership has not been fully 
coordinated and has not taken into consideration all the potentially dangerous 
geo-strategic and political-economic ramifications of that "double 
enlargement."157
As the art of warfare in the 21st century will most likely be characterized 
by increased reliance on land and sea-based cruise and ballistic missiles, anti-
missile systems and satellite communications, among other high tech non-
conventional military capabilities, neither NATO nor EU enlargement processes 
thoroughly address the key strategic-nuclear threats to European security.  
By this token, NATO may have a hard time balancing its resources 
between its original mission of collective defense and its new interests in 
peacekeeping. Moreover, both NATO and the EU have been focusing largely on 
crisis management rather than on implementing a militarily integrated system of 
crisis prevention for the entire Euro-Atlantic region. 
1. The Issue of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus 
The only premise that NATO and EU could expand their membership, 
without resulting in the potential alienation of non-NATO non-EU members, 
including Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, was for NATO, the EU, and Russia to 
work in concert through the auspices already established by the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) backed by 
overlapping NATO, EU, and Russian security guarantees, that ultimately work to 
bring Russia into both NATO and the EU as a "full" member.  
157 Hall Gardner, “NATO and the EU: The Risks of the Double Enlargement”, International 
Department American University of Paris, January 2001, available online at: 
http://www.strategicsinternational.com/enatoeu.htm. Accessed 25 March 2005. 
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In his Aachen address on June 2, 2000, the former U.S. President Bill 
Clinton proposed a long-range plan for an expanded Euro-Atlantic community 
that would incorporate Russia as a member of both NATO and the European 
Union. The President argued:  
Because the stakes are so high, we must do everything we can to 
encourage a Russia that is fully democratic and united in its 
diversity. [...] That means no doors can be sealed shut to Russia - 
not NATO's and not the E.U.'s. The alternative would be a future of 
harmful competition between Russia and the rest, and the end of 
our vision of an undivided continent.  
On the other hand 
If (Russia decides that it has no interest in formally joining 
European or transatlantic institutions), we must make sure that, as 
the EU and NATO expand, their eastern borders become gateways 
to Russia, not barriers to trade, travel, and security cooperation. 158
The double, yet largely uncoordinated, expansion of NATO and the EU 
risked the formation of exclusive geo-strategic and political economic blocs that 
are potentially capable of diverting trade away from non-EU non-NATO 
members, resulting in the potential isolation and alienation of the latter.  
Moreover, as already proven by the examples of Bosnia, Albania, and 
Kosovo, NATO or EU members could easily be drawn into a number of potential 
crises throughout Central and Eastern Europe if the double enlargement 
alienates Russia and other non-NATO non-EU members, and if each regime 
expands without coordination into regions with significant irredentist claims and 
counter-claims.  
As Russian Ambassador Vassily Likhachev put it, Russia does not oppose 
the formation of ESDP "as long as they do not create new dividing lines in 
Europe."  
 
158 President Clinton, Speech after receiving the International Charlemagne Prize, on 2 June 
2000 in Aachen, Germany. 
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NATO-Russia dialogue was formalized in 1997 with the ratification of the 
Founding Act.159 This document acknowledged that the two were no longer 
adversaries and marked the beginning of a new phase in NATO-Russia relations.  
The establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002 was a step 
forward in finding common ground and working together toward a satisfactory 
outcome between the two sides.  
Russia has barely digested NATO enlargement into Central Europe, as 
well as the war over Kosovo, but it has warned that the full integration of the 
Baltic states into NATO's command would represent a “casus belli.”160 Of 
particular concern, from the Russian perspective, was the fact that NATO and EU 
membership for the Baltic states could eliminate its right of transit to Latvia and 
the other Baltic states (which are still to a large extent dependent upon Russian 
trade and oil) and to Russian Kaliningrad, and thus limit its window to the western 
world. This would push Moscow in a counter-alliance with those Eastern 
European states not entering NATO in addition to an alliance with China and 
India. 
Despite improved dialogue, NATO and Russia have yet to resolve their 
disagreements over provisions of the CFE treaty, the continued presence of 
Russian military forces in Georgia and Moldova, and the conflict in Chechnya.161 
The Rome Summit in May 2002 was an opportunity to strengthen cooperation in 
critical areas such as Crisis Management, Terrorism, Non-proliferation, Arms 
Control/Confidence-Building Measures, Theater Missile Defense, Search and 
 
159 NATO Basic Texts, “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
between NATO and the Russian Federation”, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm. Accessed 12 April 2005. 
160 Reason for war. 
161 NATO Basic Texts, “NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality - Declaration by Heads of State 
and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation”, available online at: . 
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b020528e.htm. Accessed 10 April 2005. 
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Rescue at Sea, Mil-to-Mil Cooperation and Defense Reform, Civil Emergencies, 
and New Threats and Challenges. 162
Nevertheless, relations between NATO and Russia are influenced by the 
new NATO members, as they still have first-hand memories of political and 
cultural oppression, economic dependence and the invasion of several countries 
by Soviet tanks. They hope it will become easier to deal with Russia, in 
economical as well as in political terms, once they can do so within the EU 
framework, rather than through bilateral talks. 
2. The Issue of Turkey 
A number of disputes continue to divide the U.S. and EU perceptions that 
could prove problematic in the not so long run. Among these include Turkish-
Greek tensions over Cyprus, which have been complicated by steps taken by 
Cyprus to enter the EU. There has additionally been little incentive for Turkey to 
support new NATO members in Central and Eastern Europe unless Ankara is 
granted closer ties with the EU, and unless the significant internal and external 
security concerns facing Turkey are adequately addressed by the U.S. and EU.  
Washington fears that Turkey may turn towards radical pan-nationalism or 
pan-Islam if it is not soon brought closer to the new Europe. The EU, on the other 
hand, did not regard Turkey as strategically important following the break-up of 
the Soviet Union.  
The EU demanded that Turkey begin to engage in significant political, 
economic, and legal reforms. These affect the treatment of minorities, civil-
military relations, intervention by the Turkish army in politics, the practice of 
torture in police stations, imprisonment of peaceful Kurdish-rights activists, and 
the dire state of the economy and human rights if it is to enter the EU.163
 
162 NATO Summit Meetings, “Summit Meeting of NATO and Russia at the Level of Heads of 
State and Government”, May 2002, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2002/0205-rome/0205-rome.htm. Accessed 12 April 2005. 
163 Hall Gardner, “NATO and the EU: The Risks of the Double Enlargement”, International 
Department American University of Paris, January 2001, available online at: 
http://www.strategicsinternational.com/enatoeu.htm. Accessed 25 March 2005. 
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Additional concerns have been raised that a more "autonomous" EU could 
cut the interests of non-EU member state interests, such as Turkey, out of the 
decision-making process. The U.S. has pressured the EU to accept the Turkish 
application to join the EU, while Turkey has threatened to veto any "autonomous" 
European actions in which Turkey has not been properly consulted. 
3. The Impact of the New Members 
Departing from the limited conception of an ESDI within NATO, the current 
ESDP is projected to be relatively more autonomous in relations to NATO. 
Consequently, it has been feared that the EU could act under the ESDP without 
the advice and consent of the U.S. and other non-EU states. This issue is all the 
more problematic in avoiding a clash of interests and policy options between EU 
members and NATO members.  
Therefore, the two organizations have coordinated their enlargement so 
that EU aspirant members should first become NATO full members.164  At the 
Prague NATO Summit in November 2002, member states agreed to take in 
seven former communist states.165 This second wave of NATO enlargement was 
followed in December 2002 by the Copenhagen European Council decision to 
enlarge the union to 25 members including the new NATO members.166
The enlargement process is bringing pro-Atlanticist countries into the EU. 
The new members want a strong transatlantic alliance, but on most foreign policy 
issues, they support a European approach. On defense, however, they are 
confirmed Atlanticists. They all joined NATO enthusiastically, and see the U.S. as 
the guarantor of security in Europe.  
 
164 Robert E. Hunter, “The European Security and Defense Policy: NATO’s Companion or 
Competitor?”, Rand Publications, 2002. 
165 The second wave of NATO enlargement included: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
166 “ESDP - Facts and figures”, German Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, available online 
at: http://www.dgap-summerschool.de/en/ESDP/. Accessed 19 April 2005. The new EU members 
of 2004 are: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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As a result, these countries will be very pro-American within NATO and 
their first priority is not to harm NATO. Even if their armed forces are small and in 
need of reform, the new members are trying to develop stronger “niche 
capabilities,”167 such as Estonia’s de-mining experts, or the Czech Republic’s 
chemical and biological weapons specialists.  
The newly enlarged EU is no longer a “rich country's club.” It has included 
a bloc of poor countries, with voting power strong enough to block action unless 
their interests are accommodated.168  The U.S. views this enlargement process 
as: 
an enormously positive event that will strengthen both the EU and 
the Transatlantic partnership.169
According to European Commission figures, average GDP per head in the 
ten accession countries is less than 40% of the EU average. Yet, income 
disparities as such do not impede the functioning of the single European market. 
In fact, economic integration is more beneficial if the participating countries are 
very different.  
However, many in the current EU fear that the accession of these low-cost 
economies could create enormous economic pressure. In particular, they worry 
for example that cheap Polish or Czech exports could price Western European 
products out of the market; that Western European companies could divert 
much-needed investment to the East, where wages are much lower; or that a 
 
167 The concept of niche capabilities floated before the Prague Summit, and it is considered 
one of the Alliance’s keys to success in continuing its transformation to deal with the new 
challenges of the twenty first century. From developing specific military capabilities both NATO 
and the country benefit from reducing the costs by avoiding unnecessary duplication of 
capabilities. 
168 Steven Weber & John Zysman, “Why the Changed Relation between Security and 
Economy will Alter the Character of the Europe Union”, available online at: 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=brie. Accessed 25 March 
2005. 
169 Ambassador Schnabel, “On the Future of U.S.-EU Relations”, March 2004, available 
online at: http://www.coleurop.be/content/news/speeches/Speech%20Schnabel.pdf. Accessed 21 
April 2005. 
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massive influx of low-wage workers could add to existing unemployment queues 
in countries such as Germany and France.170  
Therefore, both NATO and EU enlargement could have problematic 
effects, in the sense of creating false expectations for the new members. In part, 
this is due to the fact that the double enlargement is taking place at a time when 
the economies of new members can hardly afford defense modernization, given 
the need to develop their relatively less advanced economies, and reflected by 
the decrease in their defense expenditures. 
For most Central European countries, the key issue remains the economy 
and the long drive to raise living standards to Western European levels. The 
regions' economies have serious weaknesses with an unemployment rate 
averaging 14 percent. Governments are struggling to control welfare and 
spending and budget deficits.  
Ultimately, the East Europeans will judge the success or failure of NATO 
and EU membership largely by its impact on their pockets. 171 It does not come 
as a surprise that a Eurobarometer poll showed that levels of satisfaction with the 
EU are generally lower in Eastern than in Western Europe. 
Although the Eastern European countries tend to grow faster than the 
current EU members, the income gap between the two groups of countries will 
narrow only slowly. Economists assume that on current trends, it would take the 
new members some decades to even it out.172 The estimation by the Economist 




170 Katynka Barysch, “Bridging the Gap”, e!Sharp, June 2003, available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/barysch_esharp_jun03.html. Accessed 12 March 2005. 
171 “Economic growth is surging for central European countries in the wake of their accession 
to the EU, while worries of meddling by Moscow come as a reminder of the political advantages 
of membership, writes Stefan Wagstyl”, Financial Times, February 2005. 
172 Heather Grabbe, “The Constellations of Europe”, Centre for European Reform, 2004. 
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Years to catch up with 
the EU 15 average 
Bulgaria  2.8 63 
Cyprus  3.1 21 
Czech Republic  3.1 39 
Estonia  4.5 31 
Hungary  3.0 34 
Latvia  3.0 58 
Lithuania  2.9 53 
Malta  3.4 29 
Poland  2.9 59 
Romania  2.6 80 
Slovakia  3.2 38 
Slovenia  3.1 31 
 
Some hope that Union money, in particular the structural funds for 
regional development, will fuel catch-up growth in Eastern Europe. The Union 
has earmarked a total of €42.6 billion for the new members in its current 1999-
2006 budget, but there are current challenges over the budget allocation.  
The new members want a larger share in regional aid in 2007 while 
current recipients, headed by Spain, are defending their allocation. The new 
members will get between €200 and €500 per head at most in 2004-06, 




                                            
173 After: “Europe Enlarged: Understanding the Impact” Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003. 
174 After: Heather Grabbe, “The Constellations of Europe”, Centre for European Reform, 
2004. 
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Yet, there is concern that the new members may not be able to use all the 
money allocated to them in the budget. Past experience shows that all the 
previous newcomers have had trouble absorbing EU funds in the first years after 
joining. 
On the whole, as presented in Table 5, the impact of enlargement on the 
current EU will be negligible, simply because the economies of the acceding 
countries are so small. Taken together, they amount to no more than 5 percent of 
the current EU (if measured at current exchange rates). 
 
Table 5.   Economic conditions in the new member states.175 
 
Country Population (millions) 
GDP € 
billion 
GDP per capita 




Cyprus  0.7 13 80 69 
Czech Republic  10.2 136 57 65 
Estonia  1.4 13 42 62 
Hungary  10.2 121 51 57 
Latvia  2.4 18 33 60 
Lithuania  3.5 31 37 60 
Malta  0.4 5 55 55 
Poland  38.6 356 40 52 
Slovakia  5.4 60 48 58 
Slovenia  2 32 69 57 
EU-15 377 8,830 100 64 
 
Last but not least, it should not be overlooked the fact that the 
enlargement process has been based on the assumption that EU candidates, 
                                            
175 From: Katinka Barysch, “Does enlargement matter for the European Union economy?”, 
Centre for European Reform, London, May 2003, available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_enlargement_economy.pdf. Accessed 23 March 2005.  
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once accepted, will sign up for the whole acquis communautaire176, and 
therefore, become potential EMU members. However, if countries discover that 
the shift to a single currency is hurting their economies and that the new political 
arrangements are not to their liking, some of them might want to leave, exposing 
the whole zone to a very high risk.177   
A new clause allows for the withdrawal of any member state without 
renegotiation of the Constitution or violation of treaty commitments. Under this 
clause, when a country notifies the Council of its intent to withdraw, a settlement 
is agreed upon in the Council with the consent of Parliament. If negotiations are 
not agreed upon within two years, the country leaves anyway. 
The security and economic considerations presented above are likely to 
increase tensions over the process of the EU constitution ratification under way, 
not only within the EU, but also within the transatlantic framework. 
4. The Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe  
The constitutional treaty was signed in a ceremony at Rome on October 
29, 2004. It brings together, for the first time, the many treaties and agreements 
on which the EU is based. The European Union will be made a super-state by its 
constitution, removing powers from member states and concentrating many of 
them in Brussels. It will create a legal personality, an unelected president, a 
foreign minister and diplomatic service, a judicial system, recognized external 
borders, a military capacity and a police force.  
 
176 This is a French term meaning, essentially, “the EU as it is” – in other words, the rights 
and obligations that EU countries share. The “acquis” includes all the EU’s treaties and laws, 
declarations and resolutions, international agreements on EU affairs and the judgments given by 
the Court of Justice. It also includes action that EU governments take together in the area of 
“justice and home affairs” and on the Common Foreign and Security Policy. “Accepting the 
acquis” therefore means taking the EU as you find it. Candidate countries have to accept the 
“acquis” before they can join the EU. 
177 Martin Feldstein, “EMU and International Conflict”, Foreign Affairs, Vol 76, Issue 6, New 
York, December 1997, available online at: http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3040_85.pdf. 
Accessed 12 February 2004. 
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However, before it enters into force, the constitution must be ratified by 
each member state. In some aspects, like governments being reluctant to 
transfer sovereignty to Brussels, the ongoing ratification process leaves room for 
uncertainty. The process is likely to take around two years to complete.  
Ratification takes different forms in each country, depending on its 
traditions, constitutional arrangements, and political processes. Lithuania, 
Hungary and Slovenia have already completed parliamentary ratification of the 
treaty.  
In addition, the European Parliament has also approved the treaty by a 
huge majority. Ten of the 25 member states have announced their intention to 
hold a referendum on the subject. In some cases, the result will be legally 
binding; in others it will be only consultative. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, critics of the Constitution point out that, 
compared to many existing national constitutions (i.e., the 4,600-word U.S. 
Constitution), the European Constitution is very long and complex, being: 
considered as: 
an unreadable mish-mash of political correctness, 
micromanagement, bureaucratic jargon, artful ambiguity, deliberate 
obscurity, and stunning banality that somehow limps its way 
through some 500 pages.178
Proponents respond by stating that the document nevertheless remains 
considerably shorter and less complex than the existing set of treaties that it 
consolidates. Defenders also point out that it must logically be longer, since it is 
not an all-embracing, general constitution, but rather a document that precisely 
delineates the limited areas where the EU has competence to act over and 
above the competences of member states. 
 
178 Andrew Stuttaford, “Constitutionally indisposed”, National Review, February 2005, 
available online at: http://www.nationalreview.com/stuttaford/stuttaford200502220745.asp. 
Accessed 19 April 2005. 
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Even harsher critics expect that the European constitution will put the 
transatlantic relation into a different light. They affirm, “under such a regime, 
trans-Atlantic relations will be dealt a fatal blow.”179  
First, trade will suffer under the protectionist regulations predicted as 
inevitable under a united Europe. Second, the constitution contains defense-
related clauses that would much increase EU's legally binding power in security 
matters, leaving room for the idea of a European military capacity built as an 
alternative to NATO, outside its umbrella.  
This could put the large number of NATO forces committed to Europe in 
limbo, and compromise future “coalitions of the willing.” There are concerns that 
an EU military alliance and common foreign policy would cut across 
the obligations of the EU's NATO members, while ending the 
neutrality of its non-NATO ones.180
 
179 Martin Callanan, “Be wary of the EU constitution”, Washington Times, March 2005, 
available online at: http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20050301-085632-1395r.htm. 
Accessed 17 March 2005. 
180 Martin Callanan, “Be wary of the EU constitution”, Washington Times, March 2005, 
available online at: http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20050301-085632-1395r.htm. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. PREMISES FOR FUTURE TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION 
It has become more than a cliché that the U.S. and Europe share a set of 
common Western beliefs. Their aspirations for humanity are much the same, 
even if their vast disparity of power has now put them in very different places.  
Relations between the U.S. and Europe have become strained in years 
past on issues ranging from the Middle East to trade protectionism, defense 
policies to diplomacy, terrorism to international treaties. Yet for all the 
differences, there is still more that unites than divides the two continents. 
The controversy over Iraq pitted European countries against each other. It 
created major friction across the Atlantic and fueled the stereotype about the 
“irreconcilable differences” between America and Europe. At the same time, 
ideas of turning Europe into a "counterweight" to the U.S. have also surfaced.181 
However, the truth is that Europe has a priority in solving its integration problems 
and does not want to define itself in opposition to the U.S.  
The U.S. and EU should return to the spirit that governed transatlantic 
relations since the inception of European unification after World War II, when the 
fundamental trace was active U.S. support for European integration:  
The building of a strong, peaceful and prosperous Europe since 
World War II is one of the greatest triumphs of American diplomacy 
and the current success of European integration would have been 
unthinkable without America’s strong commitment to European 
security through NATO and the role of Europe's transnational 
institutions.182
 
181 Gunter Burhardt, “A Chance to Rebuild the Transatlantic Partnership”, European Institute, 
Fall 2004, available online at: 
http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2004_fall/2004_fall_30.php4. Accessed 11 Apr. 
2005. 
182 Betsy L Anderson, “The U.S. international strategy and the transatlantic link”, remarks 
delivered at University of Gotland on the occasion of the Seminar on European and International 
Security, September 2004. 
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The bottom line is European integration was a great victory for both sides 
of the Atlantic. Overall, it was a positive-sum game because pursuing one goal, 
security, helped achieve the other, economic growth, and conversely the new 
objectives and institutions of the economy were instruments for security policy. 
The common goal today is an effective and balanced partnership. Despite 
the differing approaches of the British, French and German governments, most 
European leaders have a similar strategic objective: to keep the U.S. within a 
multilateral framework.183
However, as President Bush maintained in his recent European tour, the 
rifts in the transatlantic alliance over the past two to three years should pertain to 
the past. In the uncertain world of the 21st century, with a huge list of challenges, 
both sides should realize that none can be successfully tackled alone, and it is 
desirable to have permanent allies.  
The divide between Europe and the U.S. did not arise because of poor 
atmospherics or miscommunication. It arose because each side has taken 
actions the other strongly opposes, or declined to join in actions the other 
strongly favors. Moreover, these disputes have become self-perpetuating. 
American policies spark hostility among Europeans, or vice versa. That hostility, 
in turn, convinces leaders on both sides that they have no choice but to go it 
alone.184 This is a vicious cycle that benefits no one and must be brought to an 
end. 
Europe needs America. American power applied for principled ends 
helped make possible the creation and expansion of the EU and the model of 
peaceful integration among democracies that it represents. Today, Europe has at 
least as great an interest in seeing such a model take root in the greater Middle 
 
183 Charles Grant, “Transatlantic rift: How to bring the two sides together”, Centre for 
European Reform, London, July 2003, Available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/p467_transatlantic_rift_cg.pdf. Accessed 10 March, 2005. 
184 Phillip Gordon & Charles Grant, “A Concrete Strategy for Mending Fences”, International 
Herald Tribune, February 2005, available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/grant_gordon_iht_17feb05.html. Accessed 29 April 2005. 
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East, through the defeat of terror, a stable Iraq, control of dangerous weapons, 
an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the rise of open societies across the 
region.185 Without the United States, none of these goals can be achieved, nor 
can any other great global endeavor in which Europe believes in, from the fight 
against poverty and disease to the protection of the environment.  
America also needs Europe. Without the aid of its allies, Americans will 
alone pay the costs, in lives and treasure, of maintaining global stability. Without 
the support of other leading democracies, America will be a less effective 
champion of democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere in the world. Its 
policies will lack the measure of legitimacy that comes from a transatlantic 
consensus. Its initiatives will be increasingly resented and resisted. Its battle for 
hearts and minds in the Muslim world will likely be lost. 
There can only be joint transatlantic answers to these huge security 
challenges. Only on the basis of a common international agenda and joint action 
can the stronger Europe and the U.S. as a global power effectively exploit their 
potential as zones of stability at home and as exporters of stability to the rest of 
the world. Together, Europe and the U.S. have an enormous weight in the world, 
they earn two-thirds of the global GDP and through their weight, they can 
decisively influence the political agenda.  
 
B. THE FUTURE OF ESDP 
On the ESDP, there are cautious grounds for optimism. Skeptics consider 
that a common Security and Foreign Policy will be difficult in Europe for many 
years to come, for essentially four reasons.186  
First, European countries diverge in their preferences on goals and means 
in foreign policy. As presented in Figure 9, opinion polls show that about 78 
 
185 “A Compact between the United States and Europe”, February 2005, available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/us_europe_compact_feb16_05.pdf. Accessed 27 April 2005. 
186 Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, “The European Union: A Politically Incorrect View”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, No 4, Vol. 18, Fall 2004. 
percent of European citizens feel that the EU should be more involved in foreign 
policy. Yet, these polls do not make it clear which foreign policy the citizens of 
different countries favor. 
 
 





                                            
187 From: “Eurobarometer 62 Public Opinion in the European Union”, available online at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62first_en.pdf. Accessed 23 April 
2005. 
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Second, even if all European countries decided to give up their 
sovereignty in issues of foreign policy, which is very unlikely, still, different EU 
institutions would want to have a say. They are entitled to do so under the 
Constitution.188  
Progress in the development of foreign and defense policy at the 
European level was hampered by the turf war between European institutions and 
the fuzzy allocation of powers between national governments and European 
institutions. In many key areas such as defense, member states are, at the same 
time, both willing to co-operate and yet reluctant to transfer further national 
sovereignty. 
The Europeans need to overhaul the institutions of their foreign and 
defense policy so that the EU becomes a more effective and coherent external 
actor. Countries outside the EU often found it a nightmare to deal with, because 
of slow decision-making, the rotating presidency, and the multiplicity of 
spokesmen on external issues.  
Third, European countries are unwilling to spend more on defense. The 
U.S. defense budget is greater than the combined spending of the next 25 
countries. Europe spends about 2 percent of GDP in defense, the United States, 
about 3.5 percent and growing. Moreover, these numbers underestimate the 
differences in military capabilities on the two sides of the Atlantic.189
Fourth, important EU members have a strong aversion to engaging in 
military actions that put men and women on the ground. One area in which the 
U.S. is not as strong is in the size of its ground troops. Thus, it becomes 
especially difficult for the U.S. to engage an enemy in its own territory.190 Europe 
could, in principle, provide help in this dimension, but based on previous 
 
188 “Whose Europe? National Models and the Constitution of Europen Union”, European 
Studies, Oxford, 2003. 
189 Steven Everts, “Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Managing Divergence in 
Transatlantic Foreign Policy” Centre for European Reform, Working Paper, February 2001. 
190 Barry R. Posen, “Command of Commons; The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony”, 
The MIT Press Journals, 2003. 
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experiences in Yugoslavia, it is unclear whether European public opinion and 
European governments would tolerate loss of European lives.  
In addition, the result of the large U.S. investment in technology is a great 
reduction of risk to military personnel. Hence, to achieve the same military 
objective, EU forces currently face much larger risks than U.S. forces. This 
reinforces the unwillingness of European countries to put men and women on the 
ground.191  
The second Administration of President Bush has to deal the ESDP as it 
enters its more practical stage. Thus, it will have to decide whether or not it will 
continue the rather conditional U.S. support so far and encourage a strong more 
capable EU to take its place in the security and defense arena. To this day, the 
U.S. calls for greater collective European action, but insists on American 
approval before any joint European initiative, especially in security matters. 
American policymakers decry the European culture of dependency on U.S. 
leadership, while insisting in the same breath that it continue. 
Of key importance to the future of European security is not only the further 
enlargement of NATO and the EU as the main structures of political, military and 
economic stability in Europe, but also an appropriate rapprochement between 
them. According to a senior NATO official, the relation between NATO and EU is 
currently tensed.  
Despite that the two organizations are uniquely placed at less than six 
miles apart to communicate, share ideas and cooperate, there is now a 
competition for influence between them: 
The relationship between the EU and NATO is in flux because both 
are jockeying for influence on the international stage. […]  
As the EU moves slowly along the road toward doing more defense 
and security, it is seen as threatening to NATO. NATO knows it is 
 
191 Kori Schake, “Constructive Duplication: Reducing EU Reliance on U.S. Military Assets”, 
Centre for European Reform, Working Paper, London 2002, Available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/cerwp12_cd.pdf. Accessed 11 March 2005. 
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no longer Washington's first port of call for its military missions. It is 
becoming a toolbox for the U.S.192  
The growth of a military role for the EU should not be viewed as a zero- 
sum game. More of the EU should not mean less for NATO, which for the time 
being remains the continent’s security backbone. Therefore, the author believes 
there is enough potential to further increase the synergy between NATO and 
ESDP.  
Moreover, analysts agree that NATO is not likely to collapse in the 
foreseeable future, because it remains vital to the Europeans and useful to the 
U.S. There is little desire to dismantle what is seen widely as the most successful 
defense alliance in history.193  
Britain and other strong U.S. allies in Europe are determined to keep 
NATO alive. Additionally, Eastern European nations who have joined or hope to 
join NATO, and are taking an increasingly important role on the continent, are 
fervent supporters of the U.S. alliance. 
Most European nations spend very little on defense. Losing NATO and the 
U.S. defense umbrella it provides would force them to spend much more if they 
wanted a credible defense. At the same time, while the U.S. complains about 
Europe's low defense spending and political indecision, the alliance is useful to 
Washington, adding to its global authority and providing allied forces and bases.  
So far, political statements on both sides of the Atlantic show a tendency 
to agree on the fact that European allies need to accept greater responsibilities 





192 Judy Dempsey, “For EU and NATO a race for influence”, International Herald Tribune, 
Paris, February 2005. 
193 “Analysts: The Iraq Crisis May Damage, but not Destroy NATO” Associated Press, 
available at: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,78328,00.html. Accessed 21 April 2005. 
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C. COLLABORATION ON TERRORISM AND WMD 
Over the past decade, the U.S. has spent $7 billion on helping post-Soviet 
countries decommission nuclear weapons and manage nuclear materials. By 
comparison, the EU countries have spent only $1 billion.194  
The Europeans need to show that they take the threats of WMD and their 
proliferation seriously. Many European governments have an extensive 
experience in dealing with terrorism and do not underestimate its dangers. Yet 
they have tended to be nonchalant about the risks of unguarded nuclear 
materials in Soviet successor countries, as well as the dangers of rogue states 
acquiring chemical and biological weapons, or ballistic missiles.  
European proliferation experts are right to argue that, despite the evident 
weaknesses of arms-control regimes, some of them are genuinely useful. 
America’s opposition to these regimes sometimes appears to be ideological, 
opposing any constraint on America’s freedom of maneuver. Sometimes it also 
seems to be the result of corporate lobbying, as when pharmaceutical companies 
oppose the proposed inspection regime of the Biological Weapons Convention. 
Surely it is the time for a grand transatlantic bargain on proliferation. The 
U.S. should sign up to some of the binding regimes, such as the Biological 
Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the UN 
Convention on Small Arms.  
In return, the Europeans should agree to champion more effective and 
tougher action against the threat of proliferation. For example, they could offer 
more cash for dealing with the problem of Russia’s nuclear weapons facilities; 
they could support harder sanctions against countries that proliferate; and, when 
there is a convincing case for preemptive action, they could join the U.S. in 
military missions to destroy WMD that threaten the peace. 
 
 
194 Charles Grant, “Transatlantic rift: How to bring the two sides together”, Centre for 
European Reform, London, July 2003, Available online at: 
http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/467.html. Accessed 10 March, 2005. 
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D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The U.S. National Security Strategy statement that the U.S. might need to 
take preemptive action against a serious threat to its security was not in itself 
new or shocking. In fact, any government would want to reserve that right.  
Yet the Bush doctrine of preemption raises obvious questions for global 
governance, such as who judges what is a serious threat, and whether some 
countries may be tempted to use the doctrine as an excuse to launch wars of 
their own. The document’s failure to address such questions, combined with the 
scarcity of references to NATO, EU, and coalition warfare has agitated the spirits 
in Europe.  
The U.S. must be aware that there is a price to be paid for acting 
unilaterally and make an effort to act within the framework of international 
organizations and agreements. As Harvard’s Joseph Nye has observed, “the 
more the U.S. behaves in a unilateral manner, the more its soft power is liable to 
diminish.”195 The consequence is likely to be an increase in anti-American 
sentiment in other countries, greater difficulty in putting together international 
coalitions, and a higher chance of blockage of U.S. objectives by other 
governments in the international forum. 
Furthermore, the U.S. should remember that the style of its diplomacy 
affects outcomes.  One example is the divide-and-conquer tactic by the 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to divide the "new" Europe of former 
Soviet satellites from the "old" Europe of major states during the transatlantic 
dispute over Iraq.196 Not only did it not work, it rather increased the anti-American 
feelings. It is clear that the new EU nations today look more closely to Brussels 
rather than to Washington. 
 
195 Charles Grant, “Transatlantic rift: How to bring the two sides together”, Centre for 
European Reform, London, July 2003, Available online at: 
http://www.weltpolitik.net/Sachgebiete/Internationale%20Sicherheitspolitik/GASP/Analysen/%22S
ecurity%20Challenges%20in%20Transatlantic%20Relations.%22.html. Accessed 10 March, 
2005. 
196 “Rumsfeld Seeks to isolate ‘old Europe’ opponents”, Timesonline January 2003, available 
online at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-553261,00.html. Accessed 29 April 2005. 
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The U.S. should continue to make every effort to keep a broad 
international coalition in the postwar Iraq. Otherwise, the impact of the 
unilateralist U.S. war could be to divide the EU governments, diminish British 
influence in the EU, weaken the EU’s common foreign and security policy, and 
undermine the authority of the UN. Ultimately, the consequences of such policy 
could prove dangerous by hunting back the U.S. interests. 
Moreover, the U.S. should avoid using double standards and try to appear 
even-handed on the Middle East policy. This could have a huge impact on 
America’s prestige and reputation, not only in Arab lands, but also all over the 
world.  
After military victory in Iraq, it will be much easier for the U.S. to build a 
credible future coalition if, at the same time, it makes a priority of advancing the 
Israel-Palestine peace process. The U.S. could still be the leading external party 
in the peace process, but it could achieve more by working with the EU.  
Americans need to remember that they cannot accomplish many of their 
global objectives such as tackling terrorism, proliferation and the drugs trade, or 
dealing with Arab state failure or integrating Russia and China into the world 
system, without allies. The European countries, for all their evident flaws, not 
only have considerable international clout but also are the most like-minded 
countries that the U.S. is going to be able to work with. It is in the interests of 
both that the transatlantic bond should remain the closest between any two 
continents. 
For their part, European leaders should understand that if they want to 
encourage the U.S. to act multilaterally, they must work with the U.S. and be 
prepared to back the use of force as an option in hard cases. If Europe can 
become a more useful partner, the U.S. will have stronger incentives to work with 
it. 
Nevertheless, the European governments need to continue enhancing 
their military capabilities. They need to spend their money more efficiently on 
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capabilities such as communications, precision-guided munitions, airlift, tanker 
aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and the suppression of enemy air defenses. 
Also, they need more troops able to engage in high-intensity warfare outside 
Europe. 
By the same token, the EU leaders should continue to encourage new 
members to develop their niche capabilities and expand the use of pooled 
capabilities. In areas such as air transport, maintenance of fighter aircraft, 
medical facilities, and the delivery of supplies, much money could be saved 
through the creation of pooled operations. In this respect, the cooperative 
examples of NATO’s existing AWACS and future airborne ground surveillance 
fleets should be more widely followed. 
The expectation is that commitments agreed upon at the NATO summits 
in Prague and recently in Istanbul will be successfully implemented. Where the 
EU has failed to make an impact, NATO may succeed.  
The specific capability goals approved by heads of government are more 
realistic and replace the 58 goals of the earlier Defense Capabilities Initiative 
(DCI), which were too many to be taken seriously and thus, failed due to lack of 
commitment. Hopefully, the new NATO Reaction Force, which is designed to 
fight alongside American elite forces in dangerous situations, will spur the 
Europeans to enhance the quality of their own cutting-edge troops and speed up 
sluggish military reforms.  
Not only do Europeans need to spend their defense budgets more wisely, 
but they also need to spend more. Bigger budgets produce better capabilities. If 
all EU countries would aspire to spend at least 2.5 percent of GDP on defense 
(the British and French levels) this would be a significant contribution to the goal 
of closing the capabilities gap. They should also agree to spend 20 percent of 
their defense budgets on procurement and R&D.  
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Evidently, such additional resources for security investments can only 
come from a strong well-functioning economy. In this respect, despite the recent 
economic recovery, there are still challenges to be met in at least two aspects.  
First, the implications of the single currency should not be over-estimated. 
The euro has sometimes been portrayed as a miracle cure of Europe’s illnesses 
and as a definitive recipe for growth. When, in fact, the real benefits that it 
delivers are no alternative whatsoever to the necessary focus on innovation, 
education, or labor and goods market reform, in the environment of unabated 
technological progress envisioned by the Lisbon process. The biggest European 
challenge is to go beyond pompous verbosity and make things happen. 
Second, there is a distinct possibility that economic growth in Europe 
could slow down prematurely, due to a failure of its policymaking system to 
deliver the necessary balance between macroeconomic and structural policies, 
or between fiscal and monetary policy. Although significant progress has already 
been achieved in the EU economic development, with agreements on the 
objective of price stability, a framework for fiscal discipline, and the Lisbon 
medium-term strategy for economic reform, there is still a long way to go, 
especially in the context of new and further European enlargement processes.  
Moreover, the EU should learn to use policies on trade and aid to support 
its political objectives. The EU should link the granting of trade privileges and 
financial assistance to clear commitments from recipient countries to promote 
political and economic reform.  
Often, the EU’s ties to less-developed countries are governed by trade 
and cooperation, association, or other sorts of agreements. These usually 
contain clauses with respect to human rights, political pluralism, and standards of 
good governance. Armed with these clauses, the EU should be able to wield 
considerable influence.  
The EU should be bolder in linking non-compliance with human rights 
clauses to concrete actions, such as the postponement of new projects, the 
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suspension of high-level contacts, or the use of different channels of delivery 
(such as independent NGOs, rather than government-run bodies). Hitherto the 
EU has imposed sanctions only on the most egregious offenders, such as 
Zimbabwe and Belarus.197 It needs to become more confident about linking the 
economic and diplomatic sides of its foreign policy. The result would be a more 
influential EU, and thus a more useful partner for the U.S. 
For all the above considerations, the transatlantic relationship remains 
irreplaceable. Acting together, the EU and the U.S. can be a formidable force for 
peace and positive development in the world. Hence, it shouldn’t be too naïvely 
optimistic to expect that a little common understanding could still go a long way. 
 
197 Charles Grant, "Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations.", Transatlantic 
Internationale Politik, 2/2003, available online at: 
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